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NEW LIMITS ON THE CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE:
AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE
A11 political power is inherent in the people. Government is insti-
tuted for their protection, security, and benefit, and they have the
right to alter or reform it when the public good may require. *
I. INTRODUCTION
The initiative power, the power to propose or reject laws by direct
action of the people,' is a continual source of controversy in California
politics. The typical subjects of recent California initiatives are highly
charged, emotion-laden issues that have defied resolution in the normal
legislative process; they are not the routine measures that otherwise oc-
cupy much of the legislature's time. Precisely because so many current
political controversies find public expression through the initiative pro-
cess, the permissible scope and use of the initiative power is important.
Because so many broad and noteworthy measures are proposed as initia-
tives, a close scrutiny of the case law surrounding the initiative power is
warranted.
As it has been employed in California, the initiative has been a po-
tent force on the political landscape. Californians have resorted to the
use of the initiative more often than the citizens of any other state.2
Although only a small fraction of the laws enacted each year are enacted
through the initiative process,3 Californians have used the initiative to
* CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1.
1. The initiative power is reserved to the people of California in article IV, section 1 of
the California Constitution: "The legislative power of this State is vested in the California
Legislature which consists of the Senate and Assembly, but the people reserve to themselves
the powers of initiative and referendum." CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
The initiative is described in article II, section 8(a) of the California Constitution: "The
initiative is the power of the electors to propose statutes and amendments to the Constitution
and to adopt or reject them." CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(a).
2. Between October, 1911 and December, 1984, 573 initiatives (554 direct, 19 indirect)
were circulated. Of these, 184 have qualified for the ballot and four qualified for submission to
the legislature. Fifty-two initiatives were approved by the voters, one indirect initiative was
approved by the legislature. CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE MARCH FONG Eu, A HISTORY OF THE
CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE PROCESS, Dec. 1984, at 8 (updated annually) [hereinafter cited as
HISTORY OF THE CALIFORNIA INrTIATIVE]. For a discussion of the indirect initiative in Cali-
fornia, see infra note 25.
3. For example, 6394 bills were introduced and 3087 bills were enacted by the California
Legislature during the 1983-84 legislative session. ASSEMBLY FINAL HISTORY, 1983-84 Reg.
Sess., at 34. During the same two year period, 44 initiatives were circulated and nine of these
qualified for the ballot. Of the nine, three were enacted by the voters. HISTORY OF THE CALI-
FORNIA INITIATIVE, supra note 2, at 39-41.
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adopt major, sweeping measures with dramatic effects.4
This use of the initiative power in California has generated a long
and lively debate. Vigorous criticism and calls for reform are met by
equally staunch defenses. Critics perceive a process captured by special
interests and too easily manipulated by misleading advertising and exces-
sive campaign spending.5 Supporters defend the initiative as an admit-
tedly flawed but vital recourse for voters against the actions or inaction
of an unresponsive legislature.'
The initiative power is grounded in the California Constitution.
The constitution, however, provides few limitations on the breadth and
scope of this power.' Within the sketchy outline set out in the constitu-
tion, courts have shaped the permissible limits of the initiative power.
Traditionally, California courts have applied a liberal and expansive con-
struction to the initiative.9 The judiciary has been reverential in its
praise: the initiative powers have been described as "very favored and
4. Three of the most notable examples are Proposition 8, known as the "Victim's Bill of
Rights" initiative, enacted in the June, 1982 election; Proposition 13, the Jarvis.Gann property
tax limitation, enacted in the June, 1978 primary election; and Proposition 9, known as the
"Fair Political Practices Act," enacted in the November, 1974 general election. As testimony
to the fact that politicians are wary of direct legislation, in the 1983-84 legislative session alone,
22 measures were introduced to modify the initiative and referendum power or process. None
was successful.
5. See, ag., LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF CALIFORNIA, INITIATIVE AND REFEREN-
DUM IN CALIFORNIA: A LEGACY LOST? (1984); Comment, The California Initiative Process:
A Suggestion for Reform, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 922 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Cali-
fornia Initiative Process]; Montoya, Government by Initiative is Getting Out of Hand, L.A.
Times, Sept. 9, 1984, pt. IV, at 5, col. 1.
6. See, e.g., Comment, The Scope of the Initiative and Referendum in California, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 1717 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Scope of the Initiative]; Nielsen,
California's Legislators Asked for Their Comeuppance, L.A. Times, Oct. 14, 1984, pt. IV, at 5,
col. 4; Letters to the Editor, L.A. Times, Sept. 21, 1984, pt. II, at 4, col. 3.
7. See supra note 1.
8. Other than the brief mention of the initiative power in article IV, supra note 1, and in
article XVIII, section 3, which provides for amendments to the constitution by initiative, CAL.
CONST. art. XVIII, § 3, all constitutional limitations on the initiative power are contained in
article II, entitled "Voting, Initiative and Referendum, and Recall." Article II specifies the
number of signatures required to propose an initiative, CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(b), that initia-
tives may be voted upon at either a general or special election, CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(c), and
that an initiative may not "embrac[e] more than one subject." CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d).
Initiatives may not name an individual to hold an office, or a private corporation to perform a
function or have any power or duty. CAL. CONsT. art. II, § 12. Beyond this sketchy outline,
the legislature is required to provide for the manner in which initiative petitions shall be circu-
lated, presented, certified and submitted to the voters. CAL. CONsT. art. II, § 10(e). The legis-
lature is also directed to establish procedures for the exercise of the initiative and referendum
powers at the local level. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 11.
9. See generally Comment, Scope of the Initiative, supra note 6; Note, Los Angeles
County Transp. Comm'n v. Richmond: Taking the Initiative, 17 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 937
(1984).
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special rights,"" ° as "one of the outstanding achievements of the progres-
sive movement"11 and as an expression of "one of the most precious
rights of our democratic process."12 The California Supreme Court has
declared that it is "our duty jealously to guard the sovereign people's
initiative power."13 Thus, the courts have demonstrated a most deferen-
tial attitude toward the initiative. The few limitations recognized by the
courts have been procedural, rather than substantive, in nature.
1 4
In two recent decisions, however, the California Supreme Court has
reversed the traditional standard of judicial deference towards the initia-
tive. Substantive limits imposed by the court in these cases on the per-
missible subjects of initiative measures have narrowed the scope of the
people's initiative power. This break with traditional judicial deference is
marked by an assertive posture of judicial intervention and characterized
by a new and lower threshold of preelection review.
In Legislature v. Deukmejian, 5 the court addressed the use of the
initiative to enact a reapportionment statute. Popularly known as the
"Sebastiani Initiative" after its author, 6 the proposed initiative would
have repealed the existing apportionment plans and reapportioned all
10. Assembly v. Deukmejian, 30 Cal. 3d 638, 681, 639 P.2d 939, 945, 180 Cal. Rptr. 297,
323 (1982) (Richardson, J., dissenting); see also Legislature v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658,
683, 669 P.2d 17, 35, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781, 799 (1983) (Richardson, J., dissenting) ("In short, we
have traditionally insisted that an initiative is entitled to very special and very favored treat-
ment.") (emphasis in original).
11. Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 591, 557 P.2d
473, 477, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 45 (1976).
12. Mervynne v. Acker, 189 Cal. App. 2d 558, 563, 11 Cal. Rptr. 340, 344 (1961).
13. Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 242, 651 P.2d 274, 277, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 33
(1982).
14. See infra notes 43-62 and accompanying text.
15. 34 Cal. 3d 658, 669 P.2d 17, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983). See infra notes 65-139 and
accompanying text.
16. Assemblyman Don Sebastiani, Republican from the Eighth Assembly District (con-
taining all or portions of Napa, Lake, Sonoma and Yolo Counties) was the author and named
proponent of the initiative. The measure was promoted primarily by the California Republi-
can Party.
The Sebastiani Initiative was the latest episode in a long and bitter partisan struggle be-
tween Republicans and Democrats for control of the reapportionment process, the primary
battleground for control of the California Legislature. Unlike other initiative attempts to re-
form the reapportionment process, the Sebastiani Initiative would have enacted an actual reap-
portionmentplan fixing specific district boundaries. Never before had a reapportionment plan
been proposed by statewide initiative. HISTORY OF THE CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE, supra note
2, at 12-41.
Moreover, Assemblyman Sebastiani's initiative attempt represented a bold challenge to
both the power structure in Sacramento and, initially, his own party leadership. Not only was
his plan proposed in an uncommon way, it had been developed outside of the incumbent-
protecting, deal-ridden atmosphere typical of past reapportionments. Politically, most incum-
bents, Republicans and Democrats alike, would have been weakened if the Sebastiani reappor-
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new legislative and congressional districts in California."V After the initi-
ative qualified for a place on the ballot, Governor George Deukmejian
called a special election for the sole purpose of putting the measure to an
early vote. The court in Deukmejian removed the Sebastiani Initiative
from the ballot and enjoined the expenditure of funds for the special elec-
tion.18 Use of the initiative power to enact a reapportionment measure
was thus effectively barred.
In AFL-CIO v. Eu,19 the supreme court was confronted with an ini-
tiative which would have required the California Legislature to petition
Congress for a balanced federal budget constitutional amendment.20 The
initiative sought to withhold all legislative salaries unless and until the
petition was approved. Challengers sought a writ of mandate to enjoin
Secretary of State March Fong Eu from expending public funds or taking
any action to place the initiative on the ballot.21 The supreme court
again barred the measure from the ballot and prevented the use of initia-
tives for this purpose."2
Both the Deukmejian and the Eu decisions arose in a highly political
context. Each involved fiercely contested partisan issues and each were
dramatic attempts to reshape the California political landscape. The
Deukmejian decision was the first time in thirty-five years that a court
had removed a validly qualified statewide initiative measure from the bal-
lot; 3 the Eu decision was the second such time. Both decisions will have
tionment plan became law. Even those not directly affected found the initiative's impact
extremely disruptive of the normal conduct of business in the state capitol.
17. The existing reapportionment plans were enacted by Cal. A.B. 2 (Alatorre), 1983-84
1st Extra. Sess., ch. 6 (1983) (congressional and board of equalization districts); Cal. A.B. 3
(Boatwright), 1983-84 1st Extra. Sess., ch. 8 (1983) (assembly and senatorial districts). The
reapportionment plans are codified at CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 30000-30044 (,Vest Supp. 1986).
18. 34 Cal. 3d at 681, 669 P.2d at 31, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
19. 36 Cal. 3d 687, 686 P.2d 609, 206 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1984). See infira notes 140-85 and
accompanying text.
20. See infra note 142 for the text of the Balanced Federal Budget Initiative. Like the
Sebastiani reapportionment initiative, the balanced budget initiative was the result of a long
partisan effort to achieve through the initiative process what its proponents could not do
through the legislature. Numerous proposals to pass a resolution calling for a balanced federal
budget had failed in previous years. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d at 692, 686 P.2d at 612, 206 Cal. Rptr. at
92.
21. Id. at 690-91, 686 P.2d at 611, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
22. Id. at 716, 686 P.2d at 629, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
23. HIsTORY OF THE CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE, supra note 2, at 2-14. See also
Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d at 681, 669 P.2d at 33, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 797 (Richardson, J., dissent-
ing) (citing McFadden v. Jordan, 32 Cal. 2d 330, 196 P.2d 787 (1948) (removal of an initiative
constitutional amendment from the ballot for failure to conform to the single subject rule and
ban against wholesale revisions to the state constitution), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949)).
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an impact on the scope of the initiative power in California far beyond
the extent of their unique factual settings.
This Comment analyzes the supreme court's decisions in these far-
reaching initiative cases and their impact on the future scope of the initi-
ative power in California. The Comment begins with a brief description
of the initiative power in California and the traditional rules of judicial
construction of that power. The reasoning of the majority and dissenting
opinions in Deukmejian and Eu is examined next. An analysis and cri-
tique of these decisions and the major issues related to the initiative
power follows. Finally, the Comment discusses the impact of these deci-
sions on the permissible use of the initiative in the future and proposes a
return to the judicial deference and broad construction of the initiative
power in California.
II. THE CALIFORNIA INrIIATIVE: THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING
Limitations on the initiative power are a product of express constitu-
tional prohibitions and a seventy-five year history of judicial construction
and application of those rules. Judicial deference to the California initia-
tive stems from its populist origins and historical role as a mechanism for
governmental reform.24
A. The Initiative in the California Constitution
California's broad initiative power came into being in 1911 as an
amendment to the state constitution.25 Upon his election in 1910, popu-
list Governor Hiram Johnson promoted the initiative and the other
forms of direct legislation, the referendum and recall,26 as part of his
governmental reform package. Instituting the power of direct legislation
24. For a comprehensive history of the initiative in California, see HISTORY OF THE CALI-
FORNIA INITIATIVE, supra note 2; see also Comment, Scope of the Initiative, supra note 6;
Comment, California Initiative Process, supra note 5.
25. The initiative provisions, which became former section 22 of article IV, were approved
by the voters in a special election held on October 10, 1911 by a statewide vote of 168,744 to
52,093. HISTORY OF THE CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE, supra note 2, at 2. The initiative provi-
sions are now contained in CAL. CONST. art. 11. See supra note 1.
California presently allows direct initiatives. A direct initiative enacts a law without an
intermediate step, such as approval by the legislature. The indirect initiative previously in
effect in California required proponents, after securing the necessary signatures, to submit the
proposal to the legislature. It would be placed on the ballot only if the legislature failed to
enact the measure without change within 40 days. The provision for an indirect initiative in
the California Constitution was repealed in the 1966 general election after only infrequent use.
HISTORY OF THE CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE, supra note 2, at 2.
26. Article II of the California Constitution describes the referendum and recall powers as
follows:
SEC. 9. (a) The referendum is the power of the electors to approve or reject statutes
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was a major plank of the progressive reform movement of the early
1900's and it won acceptance in several other states during that period.27
By providing for direct legislation in the constitution, Hiram John-
son intended to give the electorate direct access to the legislative process
and wrest control of the legislative machinery from a state legislature
dominated by influential special interests.28 The primary motivation for
the initiative process in California was the desire to counter the lobby-
ist-to create a process that would give the public the ability to enact
legislation and thwart special interests.29 As Johnson said in his inaugu-
ral speech:
"[W]hile I do not by any means believe the Initiative, the Ref-
erendum, and the Recall are the panacea for all our political
ills, yet they do give to the electorate the power of action when
desired, and they do place in the hands of The People the
means by which they may protect themselves."
'30
.From the beginning, the initiative was intended as a device to
counter and override the legislature when it acted contrary to the pub-
lic's will. The initiative power was to exist in reserve, to be called upon
whenever the people found the legislature unable or unwilling to perform
in an acceptable manner. The initiative was to be the ultimate check on
legislative power.
The language of article IV of the state constitution is significant:
or parts of statutes except urgency statutes, statutes calling elections, and statutes
providing for tax levies or appropriations for usual current expenses of the State.
SEC. 13. Recall is the power of the electors to remove an elective officer.
CAL. CONST. art. II, §§ 9, 13.
27. The initiative process was first proposed in the United States at the 1892 convention of
the Populist Party in Omaha, Nebraska. Comment, The Direct Initiative Process: Have Un-
constitutional Methods of Presenting the Issues Prejudiced its Future?, 27 UCLA L. REV. 433,
433 n.3 (1979).
South Dakota became the first state to adopt the process in 1898, and the practice spread
quickly. A total of 22 states now employ some form of direct legislation: Alaska (adopted in
1959), Arizona (1911), Arkansas (1910), California (1911), Colorado (1910), Florida (1968),
Idaho (1912), Illinois (1970), Michigan (1908), Missouri (1908), Montana (1911), Nebraska
(1912), Nevada (1912), North Dakota (1914), Ohio (1912), Oklahoma (1907), Oregon (1902),
South Dakota (1898), Utah (1900), Washington (1912) and Wyoming (1968). Id. at 467-70.
There is no power of direct legislation on the federal level, although the idea has been pro-
posed. See Note, The Proposed National Initiative Amendment: A Participatory Perspective on
Substantive Restrictions and Procedural Requirements, 18 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 429 (1981).
28. Comment, California Initiative Process, supra note 5, at 923-24.
29. Id.
30. A. HICHBORN, STORY OF THE SESSION OF THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE OF 1911,
at 93 n. 115 (1911) (quoting Gov. Hiram Johnson), quoted in Comment, Scope of the Initiative,
supra note 6, at 1717.
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"The legislative power of this State is vested in the California Legislature
... but the people reserve to themselves the powers of initiative and referen-
dum."31 The exercise of the power of initiative is the exercise by the
people of a power reserved by them, rather than of a right granted to
them.32 As an express reservation of power, the clause recognizes the
people as the ultimate source of all legislative power. The California
Constitution expresses the concept which is familiar to all students of
constitutionalism:
All political power is inherent in the people. Government is
instituted for their protection, security, and benefit, and they
have the right to alter or reform it when the public good may
require.
33
It is well settled that the initiative power is limited ultimately by the
United States Constitution.34 Limitations under the California Constitu-
tion depend first on whether the initiative is proposed as a statute or as a
constitutional amendment.35 An initiative proposed as a constitutional
amendment would, obviously, propose to amend the state constitution
and is limited only by procedural requirements, such as specifications
regarding the number of signatures required and time limits for petition
circulation. There is also a ban against wholesale constitutional revisions
via the initiative.36 On the other hand, an initiative proposed as a statute
is subject to the express and implied limits of the state constitution. The
operation of these limitations depends in part upon the distinction be-
31. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (emphasis added).
32. Blotter v. FarreU, 42 Cal. 2d 804, 270 P.2d 481 (1954); Martin v. Smith, 176 Cal. App.
2d 115, 1 Cal. Rptr. 307 (1959).
33. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1.
34. Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 413 P.2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966), affid, 387
U.S. 369 (1967); Comment, Scope of Initiative Compared to Power of Legislature, 13 CAL. L.
REv. 151, 151 (1925).
35. Before 1966, the distinction between initiative statutes and constitutional amendments
was not at all clear. Similar procedural requirements made the difference one of name only,
raising the question whether a duly enacted initiative statute would be subject to, or alterna-
tively, act as an amendment to, the California Constitution. See Comment, supra note 34, at
152. This ambiguity was clarified by the passage of a constitutional amendment in 1966, CAL.
CONST. art. II, § 8(b), which changed the number of signatures required for an amendment to
eight percent of the voters in the previous gubernatorial election. The number required for an
initiative statute remained at five percent.
36. Proposed amendments to the California Constitution by the initiative process are inva-
lid if they "revise" the Constitution instead of merely "amend" it. Amador Valley Joint Union
High School Dist. v. Board of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 227, 583 P.2d 1281, 1288-89, 149
Cal. Rptr. 239, 247 (1978) (while broad in scope, changes made by Proposition 13-the Jarvis-
Gann tax limitation initiative constitutional amendment-were "nothing novel to the existing
governmental framework in California and thus did not constitute a revision to the Constitu-
tion"; the enactment deemed a constitutional "amendment").
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tween the initiative and the referendum, because the state constitution
limits each in a different way.
The initiative is described in the constitution simply as "the power of
the electors to propose statutes and amendments to the Constitution and
to adopt or reject them.' ' 37 There are three express restrictions contained
in article II. One is the rule that an initiative cannot contain more than
one subject.38 The second and third restrictions apply equally to legisla-
tive proposals to the voters and to initiatives: No statute is valid that
names any individual to hold any office and no statute can name any
private corporation to perform any function or to have any power or
duty.39 Courts have expressed the view that the initiative is otherwise
subject to the same constitutional restrictions placed upon enactments of
the legislature.'
The referendum, on the other hand, is restricted by express substan-
tive limitations in the constitution. Article II, section 9(a) defines the
referendum as "the power of the electors to approve or reject statutes or
parts of statutes except urgency statutes, statutes calling elections, and
statutes providing for tax levies or appropriations for usual current ex-
penses of the State."'" These three exceptions to the referendum power
appear to be designed to prevent harassment of legitimate and ordinary
government activities. Referenda are further restricted by article II, sec-
tion 9(b). This section allows challenges to a statute by referendum only
within the ninety days after a statute passes before it becomes effective. 42
The three categories of statutes exempt from the referendum all take ef-
fect immediately upon passage, without the ninety day "incubation pe-
riod" typical of all other statutes,
Between the initiative and referendum, the initiative appears to be
the greater power. Not only can voters propose, adopt and reject laws,
there appears to be no substantive limitations on its exercise-beyond
those generally placed upon the legislature-in the California Constitu-
tion. On the other hand, once a referendum secures enough signatures to
qualify for the ballot, the referred statute is stayed pending an affirmative
vote of the people. An initiative statute, proposing to repeal a statute
enacted by the legislature, has no such effect. The legislative enactment
37. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 8(a).
38. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d). This is a procedural, rather than a substantive, restric-
tion. See infra note 51.
39. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 12.
40. See, eg., Hays v. Wood, 25 Cal. 3d 772, 786 n.3, 603 P.2d 19, 31 n.3, 160 Cal. Rptr.
102, 118 n.3 (1979); Minges v. Board of Trustees, 27 Cal. App. 15, 148 P. 816 (1915).
41. CAL. CONsT. art. II, § 9(a).
42. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 9(b). See infra notes 69 & 83.
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challenged by an initiative would remain in operation until nullified by
vote of the people.
B. Judicial Limitations on the Initiative
Against a background of continuing controversy, the courts have
defined the permissible scope of the initiative and referendum powers
within the frameworks of the state and federal constitutions. As an exer-
cise of legislative power, judicial treatment of the initiative in California
has traditionally been one of great deference. To use the language of the
California Supreme Court in upholding the recent "Victim's Bill of
Rights" Initiative: "Consistent with prior precedent, we are required to
resolve any doubts in favor of the exercise of this precious right."43
But the courts also have recognized constitutional limits on the ex-
ercise of the initiative and referendum power. Several rules, clearer in
their statement than in their application, have been developed to mark
the bounds of direct legislation. Judicially created restrictions on the
statewide initiative are largely procedural rules. These generally fall into
three categories: (1) the "single subject" rule, (2) the administrative/
legislative distinction, and (3) the local/state distinction.'
1. The single subject rule
The single subject rule operates to limit the contents of an initiative
to one subject. The sources of this rule are twofold: First, the constitu-
tion expressly limits the number of issues that can be addressed in a sin-
gle initiative;45 and second, as an exercise of legislative power, the
initiative is subject to the constitutional restriction that the provisions of
the act be "reasonably germane" to the title of the act.46
In deference to the legislature, the courts usually do not question the
43. Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 242, 651 P.2d 274, 277, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 33
(1982) (citing Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. Board of Equalization, 22 Cal.
3d 208, 248, 583 P.2d 1281, 1313, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 271 (1978)).
44. The propriety of preelection review of initiative measures, another potential judicial
limitation, is actually an issue of justiciability and not directly related to the question of the
substantive scope of the initiative power.
45. CAL. CONsT. art. II, § 8(d). The source of this rule is said to be the infamous "ham
and eggs" initiative of 1948 which contained items as diverse as legalized gambling and the
regulation of oleomargarine. See McFadden v. Jordan, 32 Cal. 2d 330, 196 P.2d 787 (1948)
("an initiative measure embracing more than one subject may not be submitted to the electors
or have any effect"), cert denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949).
46. See Fair Political Practices Comm'n v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 33, 599 P.2d 46, 157
Cal. Rptr. 855 (1979) (the Political Reform Act of 1974, an initiative measure, held not to
involve multiple subjects in violation of the California Constitution, since its provisions are all
reasonably germane to the subject of political practices), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1049 (1980).
1053May 1986]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:1045
declarations of "germaneness" by the legislators in enacting legislative
statutes. Review of the single subject rule as it pertains to the initiative
has been a little more rigorous. The rationale- usually given is that the
public is more likely to need protection against the dangers of log-rolling
and confusion caused by the inclusion of multiple subjects in one mea-
sure. Because of these dangers, the special nature of the initiative is said
to require a narrower construction of the single subject rule than the
limitation on legislative bills.4 7
The standards by which a court would judge whether a "rational
relationship" exists between the multiple provisions of an initiative, thus
making the provisions "reasonably germane" to one another, are rather
vague.48 They depend entirely on how the "subject" or purpose of the
act is defined. Yet this rule's lack of clarity is a source of concern, for an
initiative disliked by the court may be said to have a very narrow "sub-
ject" indeed. However, the outer limits of the rule would seem to have
been set by the legislature. If the initiative power is subject to the same
constitutional restrictions as legislative power, the single subject rule
should be no more narrowly applied to the initiative than it is applied to
the legislature.
As a practical matter, the single subject restriction is only a minor
obstacle to drafting the initiative. Since 1946, no initiative has been in-
validated because of this rule. That is not to say that it has not had an
effect on initiative drafters.49 Even so, claims of a violation of the single
subject rule are usually a "last ditch" effort when all other arguments
have been exhausted.5 ° To date, the rule has not been used to restrict the
47. Id. at 50, 599 P.2d at 55-56, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 864-65 (Tobriner, J., concurring).
48. In one challenge to an initiative measure, the initiative met this test because its provi-
sions were "functionally related in furtherance of a common underlying purpose." Fair Polit-
ical Practices Comm'n v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 33, 55, 599 P.2d 46, 63, 157 Cal. Rptr.
855, 872 (1979) (Manuel, J., dissenting) (citing Schmitz v. Younger, 21 Cal. 3d 90, 97, 577
P.2d 652, 656, 145 Cal. Rptr. 517, 521 (1978)), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1049 (1980)). In addi-
tion, the diverse provisions of the "Victim's Bill of Rights" Initiative shared a common con-
cern, "general object" or "general subjet" in promoting the rights of actual or potential crime
victims "which fairly disclose[d] a reasonable and common sense relationship among their
various components in furtherance of a common purpose." Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d
236, 253, 651 P.2d 274, 286, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 40 (1982).
49. Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the Single-Subject Rule, 30 UCLA L. REV. 936
(1983).
50. Id. Challenges on this basis were made unsuccessfully in Amador Valley Joint Union
High School Dist. v. Board of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239
(1978) (Proposition 13 Jarvis-Gann Initiative) and Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651
P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982) (Victim's Bill of Rights Initiative) and the issue was not




subject matter of an initiative. It remains a procedural and not a sub-
stantive restraint on the initiative power.51
2. The administrative/legislative distinction
The distinction drawn by the courts between administrative and leg-
islative actions operates as a major constraint on the initiative power at
the local level. 2 Only a measure which is legislative in character can be
submitted to the voters. Measures characterized as administrative or ex-
ecutive in nature cannot be subject to the local initiative and referendum
process.53 This rule is said to derive from the placement of the initiative
and referendum in the same article of the constitution which confers
state legislative powers and the separation of powers doctrine.54 The rea-
son for the rule is that allowing the initiative and referendum to be in-
yoked to hinder or delay executive conduct would destroy the efficiency
necessary to the successful administration of the government's business
affairs.
55
This rule is usually invoked when courts review the initiatives and
referenda at the local level, where legislative bodies exercise both legisla-
tive and administrative functions. There would seem to be no place for
such a restriction on the statewide initiative power, since the legislature,
by definition, exercises only legislative power. No case has been brought
testing this rule as a limitation on the initiative at the state level. Con-
ceivably, the administrative/legislative rule could be invoked when a ref-
erendum is proposed for an administrative act. However, any challenge
on this basis could probably be forestalled by recasting the referendum as
an initiative proposing a change in the statute which authorized the ad-
ministrative action. The rule, therefore, is one that speaks merely to
form, not substance. Thus, the restrictions imposed on the initiative and
referendum by this rule are merely procedural and not substantive
restrictions.
51. The single subject rule is actually not a limit on what is proposed, but rather how it is
presented to the public. If an initiative is successfully challenged on this ground, the initiative
proponents could make the same statutory changes with several initiatives instead of just one.
52. Comment, Scope of the Initiative, supra note 6, at 1734.
53. Wheelright v. County of Manin, 2 Cal. 3d 448, 467 P.2d 537, 85 Cal. Rptr. 809, cert.
denied and appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 807 (1970).
54. CAL. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1 ("The legislative power of this state is vested .... ); see also
Hopping v. City of Richmond, 170 Cal. 605, 150 P. 977 (1915); Comment, Scope of the Initia-
tive, supra note 6, at 1734.
55. See Martin v. Smith, 184 Cal. App. 2d 571, 7 Cal. Rptr. 725 (1960); Simpson v. Hite,
36 Cal. 2d 125, 222 P.2d 225 (1950); Hopping v. City of Richmond, 170 Cal. 605, 150 P. 977
(1915).
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3. The local/state distinction
The third judicial restriction on the initiative and referendum power
is in reality a variant of the administrative/legislative distinction. Thus
far, it has also operated only to limit local initiatives. By statute, the
initiative and referendum at the municipal level are excluded from mat-
ters of local, non-general concern. 6 Since local matters will concern
only a small portion of the population, the theory is that the general
population should not be allowed to interfere in a purely local affair.
5 7
Local initiatives have also been prohibited to the extent they deal with
non-municipal concerns. A municipal governing body, when functioning
as an agency of the state, is beyond the reach of a municipal initiative or
referendum election." When acting pursuant to a specific state directive,
the municipality is, in effect, the administrative arm of the state. The
application of this rule has produced some curious results, 59 and the
courts have loosened its strict application in later cases. 6°
No equivalent restriction of the statewide initiative has been applied,
and the application of this rule to the statewide initiative power has never
been tested. Dictum in an early case, however, suggested it might act to
prohibit referral of statutes not affecting all citizens of the state. 1 The
opportunity for an application of this rule on the statewide level is un-
likely to arise: The signature requirements to refer a statute would pre-
clude referral or initiation of a matter affecting only a few citizens. If
such an attempt succeeded in obtaining the requisite number of signa-
tures, that fact in itself would probably indicate the issue was more than
a local concern.
These constitutional and judicial restrictions indicate that the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, in the past, has been quite hesitant to place sub-
stantive restraints on the initiative and referendum powers. For the most
part, the court has adhered to the principle that the initiative and refer-
endum should be broadly construed so as to maintain the maximum
56. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 4057 (West 1976).
57. Comment, Scope of the Initiative, supra note 6, at 1746.
58. Mervynne v. Acker, 189 Cal. App. 2d 558, 11 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1961); Simpson v. Hite,
36 Cal. 2d 125, 222 P.2d 225 (1950). See also Comment, Scope of the Initiative, supra note 6, at
1746.
59. Simpson v. Hite, 36 Cal. 2d 125, 222 P.2d 225 (1950) (construction of a county court
house a state, not a local affair-non-referrable); Hopping v. City of Richmond, 170 Cal. 605,
150 P. 977 (1915) (construction of a city hall a local affair-referrable).
60. Farley v. Healey, 67 Cal. 2d 325, 431 P.2d 650, 62 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1967) (where San
Francisco City Charter provisions did not restrict local initiative power to municipal affairs,
resolution on foreign policy could be enacted by initiative).
61. Hopping v. City of Richmond, 170 Cal. 605, 150 P. 977 (1915).
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power in the people.62 The restrictions that have been applied to the
initiative by the courts are clearly procedural and not substantive in na-
ture. Until the cases at hand, the subject matter of the initiative was
believed to be as unlimited as that of enactments of the legislature itself.
III. NEW LIMITS ON THE INITIATIVE POWER
In two decisions less than a year apart, Legislature v. Deukmejian 
63
and AFL-CIO v. Eu,64 the California Supreme Court has substantially
narrowed the scope of the people's initiative power. Both decisions are
characterized by a more aggressive review of the challenged initiative,
prior to its reaching the ballot, and by highly technical and narrow con-
struction of constitutional and decisional language by which the meas-
ures were found invalid.
A. Legislature v. Deukmejian
The political question of reapportionment by initiative presented to
the court in Legislature v. Deukmejian65 can best be understood with a
brief digression into the background of that case.
In September, 1981, following the 1980 federal census and pursuant
to state and federal constitutional directives, 66 the California Legislature
adopted three statutes reapportioning assembly, senate and congressional
districts.67 This reapportionment plan (Plan I) was severely criticized as
blatant gerrymandering designed solely for the protection of incumbents
62. Comment, Scope of the Initiative, supra note 6, at 1749.
63. 34 Cal. 3d 658, 669 P.2d 17, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983).
64. 36 Cal. 3d 687, 686 P.2d 609, 206 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1984).
65. 34 Cal. 3d 658, 669 P.2d 17, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983).
66. Article XXI, section 1 of the California Constitution provides, in relevant part:
In the year following the year in which the national census is taken under the
direction of Congress at the beginning of each decade, the legislature shall adjust the
boundary lines of the Senatorial, Assembly, Congressional, and Board of Equaliza-
tion districts in conformance with the following standards ....
CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 1.
Article I, section 3 of the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part:
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers ....
The actual enumeration shall be made within three years after the first meeting of the
Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent term of ten years, in such
manner as they shall by law direct.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (omitted provisions pertaining to representation superseded by U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 2).
67. Cal. A.B. 300, 1983-84 Reg. Sess., ch. 537, 1981 Cal. Stat. 2010 (1981) (assembly); Cal.
A.B. 301, 1983-84 Reg. Sess., ch. 535, 1981 Cal. Stat. 1905 (1981) (congressional); Cal. S.B. 99,
1983-84 Reg. Sess., ch. 536, 1981 Cal. Stat. 1988 (1981) (senate).
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and the majority Democratic party.68 Referenda petitions opposing Plan
I were circulated within the ninety days before the statutes' effective
date. 9 Proponents of the referenda subsequently secured the signatures
necessary to qualify for the primary election ballot on June 8, 1982,
thereby staying the effective date of Plan I.70
Various members of the State Assembly, Senate and United States
House of Representatives challenged the referenda in the California
Supreme Court in Assembly v. Deukmejian.71 The court allowed the vote
on the referenda to proceed, but refused to stay the operation of the chal-
lenged reapportionment statutes, as required by state constitutional refer-
endum provisions.72 The court reasoned that (1) the old congressional
68. See Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d at 690, 669 P.2d at 40, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 804 (Richardson,
J., dissenting) (calling Plan I a "blatantly gerrymandered reapportionment plan").
69. Article IV, section 8(c) of the California Constitution provides that:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subdivision, a statute enacted at
a regular session shall go into effect on January 1 next following a 90-day period from
the date of enactment of the statute and a statute enacted at a special session shall go
into effect on the 91st day after adjournment of the special session at which the bill
was passed.
(2) Statutes calling elections, statutes providing for tax levies or appropriations
for the usual current expenses of the State, and urgency statutes shall go into effect
immediately upon their enactment.
CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(c).
Article II, section 9 of the California Constitution describes the procedure for challenging
a legislative statute by referendum:
(b) A referendum measure may be proposed by presenting to the Secretary of
State, within 90 days after the enactment date of the statute, a petition certified to
have been signed by electors equal in number to 5 percent of the votes for all candi-
dates for Governor at the last gubernatorial election, asking that the statute or part
of it be submitted to the electors.
(c) The Secretary of State shall then submit the measure at the next general
election held at least 31 days after it qualifies or at a special statewide election held
prior to that general election. The Governor may call a special statewide election for
the measure.
CAL. CONST. art. II, § 9(b)-(c).
There were actually three separate petitions circulated, one each for the assembly reap-
portionment, senatorial reapportionment and congressional reapportionment. Circulators
probably felt that separate referenda petitions were necessary to avoid a potential challenge
based on the "single subject" rule and because reapportionment plans have traditionally been
enacted by separate statutes for each type of district.
70. This was the first time in 30 years that a statewide referendum had qualified for the
ballot.
71. 30 Cal. 3d 638, 639 P.2d 939, 180 Cal. Rptr. 297, cert. denied and appeal dismissed,
456 U.S. 941 (1982). The challenge was based on alleged violations of the initiative circulation
procedures. Instructions mailed to petition signers indicated they were to write in the address
where they were registered, rather than their residence, making it impossible for the Secretary
of State to verify the correct registration under the current verification procedures. Id. at 646,
639 P.2d at 947, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 301-02.
72. Article II, section 10(a) of the California Constitution provides:
An initiative statute or referendum approved by a majority of votes thereon
takes effect the day after the election unless the measure provides otherwise. If a
CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE
districts could not be used because California had been allocated two
more congressmen as a result of the 1980 census,73 (2) allowing the addi-
tional two congressmen to run "at large" was inconsistent with federal
law,7" and (3) the time was too short for the court or the legislature to
write a new plan. For these reasons the court had no choice other than
to adopt the challenged congressional reapportionment for the June, 1982
primary and the November, 1982 general elections.75
In addition, the court noted, while the state assembly and senate
reapportionment plans retained the same number of districts as they had
previously, the districts had become badly misapportioned in the eight
years since the last reapportionment, due to population shifts.7 6 There-
fore, despite language in the constitution to the contrary, the court
adopted the challenged senate and assembly reapportionment plan. The
court noted the disruption that would result from staying the challenged
plans. There was at least a chance that the plans would be approved. By
judicially adopting the challenged reapportionment plans, the court said,
it would be taking a course likely to cause less confusion. 7
On June 8, 1982, the voters rejected the statutes, thereby invalidat-
ing Plan 1.78 The three statutes comprising Plan I thus never went into
effect. However, because of the court's decision in Assembly v.
Deukmejian, primary candidates had been selected and legislators were
to be elected from the very districts that had been declared invalid.
An initiative constitutional amendment to create a bi-partisan reap-
referendum petition is filed against a part of a statute the remainder shall not be
delayed from going into effect.
CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(a).
Technically, the court stayed the reapportionment statutes and then, under its equitable
powers, judicially adopted them by its decision. Assembly v. Deukmejian, 30 Cal. 3d at 665,
639 P.2d at 955, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 313. This was contrary to the approach taken by the
supreme court in Legislature v. Reinecke, 6 Cal. 3d 595, 492 P.2d 385, 99 Cal. Rptr. 481
(1972), where the existing (old) reapportionment statutes were kept in effect while the new
reapportionment plan was put to a vote. See Assembly v. Deukmejian, 30 Cal. 3d at 674-75,
369 P.2d at 961-62, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
73. Because of an increase in the state's population between the 1970 and 1980 censuses,
California's congressional delegation was increased from 43 to 45.
74. 30 Cal. 3d at 644, 639 P.2d at 955, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 313 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 2c (1982)).
The court also feared that an "at large" election for two of these 45 congressmen would violate
the United States Constitution's standard of "one-man, one-vote." Id. at 665, 639 P.2d at 955,
180 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
75. Id. The court said that all parties had agreed that the plan adopted for the June, 1982
primary election would also be used for the November, 1982 general election. Id. at 645 n.4,
639 P.2d at 943 n.4, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 301 n.4.
76. Id. at 664 n.19, 639 P.2d at 955 n.19, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 313 n.19.
77. Id. at 668-69, 639 P.2d at 957-58, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 315-16.
78. CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE 15 (June 8, 1982).
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portionment commission and remove the task of reapportionment from
direct control of the legislature, was then qualified to be placed on the
November, 1982 ballot.7 9 This proposal would have repealed the existing
reapportionment plans and directed the new commission to draft new
legislative and congressional districts. This initiative was rejected by the
voters, however.8 0
The 1983-84 California Legislature, elected from the voter-rejected
districts, took office in December, 1982. Enactment of a new reappor-
tionment plan was the first order of business. In the waning days of his
term, Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. called an extraordinary session
of the California Legislature for this purpose.81 The legislature enacted a
second reapportionment plan (Plan II) in December, 1982, which was
signed by Governor Brown on January 2, 1983.82 This time, however,
.the senate and assembly plan was enacted as an "urgency" measure, ef-
fectively placing it beyond the reach of another referendum challenge. 3
79. Proposition 14, also known as the "Fair Reapportionment Plan," was jointly spon-
sored by the California Republican Party and Common Cause. The proposed commission was
similar to one repealed from the California Constitution in 1966.
80. The vote was 3,065,072 (45.5%) in favor and 3,672,301 (54.5%) opposed. CAL. SEC'Y
OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE 48 (Nov. 2, 1982).
81. An extraordinary session can be called by proclamation of the Governor pursuant to
CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 3(b). During an extraordinary session, the legislature has power to
legislate only on the subjects specified in the Governor's proclamation. Id.
An interesting constitutional quirk allows a brief overlap in the term of a lame-duck gov-
ernor with the terms of newly elected legislators. The California Constitution provides that
legislators' terms of office run from the first Monday in December following their election until
two years later, for Assembly members, or four years later, for Senators. CAL. CoNsT. art. IV,
§ 2(a). The Governor's term of office begins the Monday after January 1 following the election
and continues for four years. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 2. Thus, every four years, a newly elected
legislature holds office for a one month period (from the first Monday in December to the first
Monday in January) with the previously elected Governor. It was during this period that that
extraordinary session was called by the soon-to-be-departing Governor Brown.
82. Cal. A.B. 2 (Alatorre), 1983-84 1st Extra. Sess., ch. 6 (1983), adjusted the boundary
lines of congressional and board of equalization districts; Cal. S.B. 3 (Boatwright), 1983-84 1st
Extra. Sess., ch. 8 (1983), adjusted the boundaries of assembly and senate districts.
83. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 9(a) provides: "The referendum is the power of the electors to
approve or reject statutes or parts of statutes except urgency statutes, statutes calling elections,
and statutes providing for tax levies or appropriations for usual current expenses of the State."
(emphasis added).
An urgency measure becomes law immediately upon passage and is one which is "neces-
sary for immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety." CAL. CONsT. art. IV,
§ 8(d). Declaration of an urgency measure is a matter usually left to the legislature. Urgency
measures, like appropriatons, require a two-thirds affirmative vote of each house instead of the
simple majority required to enact non-urgency measures. Non-urgency measures take effect
on the January 1st of either the year following enactment or the January 1st following ninety
days after signature by the Governor, or on the date specified, whichever date is later. In the
case of measures enacted during an extraordinary session, however, non-urgency measures
take effect on the 91st day after adjournment of the extraordinary session. Id.
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The congressional and board of equalization reapportionment plan was
not enacted as an urgency measure. Because of the different effective
dates of urgency and non-urgency measures, the legislative portion of
Plan II took effect on January 2, 1983 and the congressional portion on
the 91st day after the adjournment of the extraordinary session, October
18, 1983.84
Opponents of the reapportionment plan responded quickly. A new
initiative statute, the Sebastiani Initiative, reapportioning assembly, sen-
ate and congressional districts, was submitted to the Attorney General
and the Secretary of State on March 7, 1983, and approved for circula-
tion on April 4, 1983. By June 15, 1983, the measure (Plan III) had
secured the requisite number of signatures to be placed on the next bal-
lot.8" The next available ballot, however, was the primary election to be
held on June 6, 1984. Enactment by the voters at that time would pre-
vent the use of the newly apportioned districts during the 1984 elections.
Governor Deukmejian then called a special election to be held on
December 13, 1983, for the purpose of submitting the measure to the
voters at an early date.8 6 The very next day, opponents of the Sebastiani
Initiative filed a petition for writ of mandate with the California Supreme
Court. Legislature v. Deukmejian was a challenge to the Governor's
order for a special election brought by Democrat members of the legisla-
ture and House of Representatives. The California Supreme Court is-
sued a writ of mandate and cancelled the special election, leaving Plan II
84. The First Extraordinary Session of the 1983-1984 California Legislature adjourned on
July 19, 1983.
85. As an initiative statute, the measure required at least 393,835 valid signatures. Spon-
sors of the Sebastiani Initiative submitted 573,129 signatures.
86. The Governor issued the order for a special election on July 18, 1983, after weeks of
speculation and a virtual stand-still in the conduct of normal legislative business. The partisan
nature of this action was readily apparent. Republican voters are known to have a greater
propensity to vote at elections than Democrats and this tendency is especially true at special,
single-issue elections. This tendency would be even further enhanced at an election held dur-
ing the holiday season, when only the most dedicated voters (typically Republican) would
likely turn out to vote. On the other hand, a higher than usual Democratic voter turnout
could have been expected at the June, 1984 primary, when several Democratic candidates for
President would have been actively campaigning in the state. More importantly, by holding
the election in December, the new plan, if approved, would have taken effect in time for the
1984 primary and general elections.
87. The suit was a taxpayer suit brought under § 526(a) of the California Code of Civil
Procedure. Section 526(a) is a "private attorney general statute" allowing taxpayers to chal-
lenge unlawful and wasteful expenditures of public funds. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 526(a)
(West 1979). In Deukmejian, it was alleged that since the initiative was unconstitutional, the
expenditure of approximately $14 million in public funds for the special election for the pur-
pose of allowing a vote on the measure was an unlawful and wasteful act. 34 Cal. 3d at 666,
669 P.2d at 21, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 785.
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in effect.88
1. The majority opinion
In Legislature v. Deukmejian, the majority89 first considered the pro-
priety of reviewing an initiative measure prior to its submission to the
voters.90 The court noted that "it is usually more appropriate to review
constitutional and other challenges to ballot propositions or initiative
measures after an election rather than to disrupt the electoral process by
preventing the exercise of the people's franchise, in the absence of some
clear showing of invalidity."91 The court held, however, that "where the
requisite showing of invalidity has been made, departure from the gen-
eral rule is compelled.""2 The majority then concluded that the "clear
showing of invalidity" had been made in the principal challenge to the
initiative. That challenge was that the initiative attempted to reapportion
districts for a second time after the latest decennial federal census and
that such an attempt was impermissible as a violation of a constitution-
ally mandated one apportionment per decade rule.93
The majority asserted that preelection judicial review was justified
because of the tremendous cost and disruption that could be avoided by
an early determination of the issues. First, if the initiative were allowed
to proceed and then later declared invalid, the money expended by state
and local election officials to conduct the special election would be
wasted. Second, the special election would have a highly disruptive effect
upon the conduct of the June, 1984 primary elections if the determina-
tion of district boundaries was delayed until December, 1983. While
such factors did not make the initiative "clearly invalid," they did indi-
cate that close scrutiny of the initiative was warranted at an early date.
Then, having closely scrutinized the initiative and finding it unconstitu-
tional, the court said that there was no need to keep this finding a secret.
In fact, to do so would be contrary to the salutary purposes of the one
apportionment per decade rule.
94
88. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d at 681, 669 P.2d at 31, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
89. The majority opinion was unsigned. The majority consisted of Chief Justice Bird and
Justices Mosk, Kaus, Broussard, Reynoso and Grodin. Justice Richardson was the only
dissenter.
90. 34 Cal. 3d at 665, 669 P.2d at 20, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 784.
91. Id. (citing Brosnahan v. Eu, 31 Cal. 3d 1, 4, 641 P.2d 200, 181 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1982)
(citations omitted)) (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 665-66, 669 P.2d at 20, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 784.
93. Id. at 666-67, 669 P.2d at 21, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 784.
94. Id. at 666-67, 669 P.2d at 21, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 785. The purpose ascribed to the "one
apportionment per decade" rule was to minimize the political disruption and public confusion
that inevitably accompanies a change in political district boundaries. The court noted: "Were
1062
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The court then proceeded to discuss its finding that a "clear showing
of invalidity" had been made. The majority conceded that there was no
express provision in either the state or federal constitution precluding a
second reapportionment by initiative during the period between one fed-
eral census and another.9" Prohibition of a second reapportionment, the
majority claimed, was a matter of constitutional interpretation developed
in two older cases, Wheeler v. Herbert96 and Dowell v. McLees.
97
Wheeler and Dowell both operated to bar a legislative change in district
boundaries, ruling that there could be only one apportionment in the ten
year period following the federal decennial census. This "one apportion-
ment per decade" rule was purely a product of judicial construction.98
The rule in Wheeler and Dowell was reaffirmed, the Deukmejian
we to defer judicial review until after the election, and then hold the initiative invalid on that
ground, our ruling would come too late; part of the, reason for the existence of the rule would
already have been frustrated by default." Id.
95. Id. at 668, 669 P.2d at 22, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 786. For the text of the relevant portions
of the California and United States Constitutions, see supra note 66. Except for references to
the number of assembly members and senators, article IV, § 6, there is no other mention of
reapportionment in the California Constitution.
96. 152 Cal. 224, 92 P. 353 (1907).
97. 199 Cal. 144, 248 P. 511 (1926).
98. In Wheeler, a legislative statute provided for a change in boundaries between Fresno
and Kings Counties. A portion of Fresno County was to be transferred to Kings County upon
an affirmative vote of the affected residents. A taxpayer opposed to this change attacked the
statute, claiming that in changing the county boundaries, the statute in question had the effect
of realigning senatorial district 26, which was defined by reference to the county line. At issue
was a conflict between two portions of the same section of the California Constitution. Article
IV, section 6 provided at that time:
For the purpose of choosing members of the legislature, the state shall be divided into
forty senatorial and eighty assembly districts .... In the formation of such districts,
no county, or city and county shall be divided, unless it contain sufficient population
within itself to form two or more districts; nor shall a part of any county, or of any
city and county, be united with any other county, or city and county, in forming any
district. The census taken under the direction of the Congress of the United States,
in the year one thousand eight hundred and eighty, and every ten years thereafter,
shall be the basis of fixing and adjusting the legislative districts; and the legislature
shall, at its first session after each census, adjust such districts and reapportion the
representation so as to preserve them as nearly equal in population as may be.
CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1879, amended 1980) (superceded by CAL. CONST. art. XXI) (em-
phasis added). If the legislative districts remained the same and only the county boundaries
changed, the resulting cross-over of county boundaries would have violated the first part of
section 6. If the legislative district boundaries changed to conform to the new county bounda-
ries, the change in districts would have violated the second part of section 6, the court held.
Wheeler, 152 Cal. at 235-36, 92 P. at 364.
The Wheeler court held that the restriction regarding the combination of counties limited
the legislature's general apportionment power but did not restrict the legislature's general
grant of power to change county boundaries from time to time. That is, a general grant of
legislative power in article I would supersede the specific restriction regarding apportionment
in the constitution. 152 Cal. at 237, 92 P. at 358-59 (1907).
While the county boundaries should be changed as intended, the legislative districts
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court explained, in Yorty v. Anderson.99 In Yorty, the court held that an
exception to the "one apportionment per decade" rule was allowed when
a previous plan had been invalidated by the courts or rejected by the
people."°° The court there held that the legislature itself could enact a
should remain as originally drawn. The Wheeler court read article IV, section 6 to preclude a
second reapportionment in one decade by the legislature. The court explained:
The provisions of section 6 of article IV being construed as limitations, and being
mandatory and prohibitory, it follows from their terms, and from the application of
the maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, that the legislative power to form
legislative districts can be exercised but once during the period between one United
States census and the succeeding one, and that having been thus exercised in 1901,
the districts cannot be again adjusted until the season of 1911 .... This is a case to
which the rule should be applied, since great abuses might follow a too frequent
exercise of the power.
Id. Thus, the constitutional ban against a second reapportionment was held to take prece-
dence over the constitutional rule against district boundaries crossing county lines. The court
said that the challenged statute should not be declared unconstitutional unless it can be shown
beyond a reasonable doubt that it conflicts with fundamental law and no reconciliation with
the constitutional language is possible. Id.
A similar situation was presented in Dowell. At that time, the 79th Assembly District was
defined by statute as all of that territory within the City of San Diego; the 80th Assembly
District as all that portion of San Diego County not within the San Diego city limits. When
the city annexed two county areas pursuant to a state statute, the two assembly districts were
thereby realigned. The Dowell court, relying on Wheeler, construed the constitutional lan-
guage to prohibit a second reapportionment by the legislature. 199 Cal. at 145-46, 248 P. at
511. In reaching this conclusion, the Dowell court stated:
In fixing and readjusting the boundaries of assembly districts the legislature acts pur-
suant to the provisions of section 6 of article IV of the constitution. Under that
section, which is mandatory and prohibitory, the power to form legislative districts
can be exercised but once during the period between one United States census and
the succeeding one (Wheeler v. Herbert, 152 Cal. 224), and by the terms of the sec-
tion, until the legislative power is exercised as therein provided, assemblymen shall
be elected by the districts as theretofore established.
Id. at 146, 248 P. at 511-12. The annexation would be valid, the court said, but the district
boundaries could not change. As a result, the 80th Assembly District was to include the newly
annexed portions of the City of San Diego. Id.
99. 60 Cal. 2d 312, 384 P.2d 417, 33 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1963). In Yorty, petitioners challenged
a second reapportionment plan developed by the legislature to be used in the event the courts
ruled a previously-enacted plan invalid. Petitioners argued that the Reapportionment Com-
mission which existed at that time should draft the second reapportionment plan because the
one apportionment per decade rule barred the legislature from doing so. Id. at 316-17, 384
P.2d at 426, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
100. Id. The Yorty court said:
The views expressed herein are not inconsistent with the position taken by this court
in [Wheeler and Dowell], that the power to form legislative districts under section 6
(as it read prior to the 1926 amendment) could be exercised but once during the
period between one federal census and the succeeding one. It is apparent that the
statements in the opinions related to the effect of a valid reapportionment, not one
which is inoperative because of a violation of the Constitution, and there is nothing in
those decisions which would preclude the Legislature from making a second reappor-
tionment after nullification of its first effort by the courts or by referendum.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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second plan if the first plan had been nullified. 101 The Deukmejian court
thus concluded that while a second reapportionment in one decade
would be allowed if the first had been declared invalid or rejected, a sec-
ond reapportionment would not be allowed as long as the first plan was
still valid law.1"2
While the court recognized that the once a decade rule as expressed
in Wheeler, Dowell and Yorty applied only to reapportionment of state
legislative districts, it explained that the rule should be applicable to con-
gressional reapportionment as well.103 And, because voters had amended
the California Constitution in 1980 with virtually no changes in the reap-
portionment provisions, the court concluded that the people intended to
adopt the judicial interpretation of that language as well, absent evidence
of a contrary intention."°
The court then addressed two arguments against the one apportion-
ment per decade rule. First, the initiative proponents argued that the
rule should apply only to acts of the legislature, and not to acts by the
people through the initiative. Since the people are the source of all legis-
lative power, the constitution should be interpreted in a way that protects
and enhances that power. An exception should be made to the one ap-
portionment per decade rule, proponents argued, because of the initia-
tive's paramount status.
10 5
The majority dealt with this first objection by citing numerous in-
stances where the legislative power exercised by the people was held to be
"coterminous" with legislative power exercised by the legislature.106 The
court stated that state and federal constitutional provisions act to restrict
101. Id. This, in fact, is what allowed the legislature to enact Plan II, after Plan I had been
invalidated by the voters in November, 1982.
102. 34 Cal. 3d at 671, 669 P.2d at 24, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 788. As the Deukmejian court
said, "that rule [ofDowell and Wheeler] did not preclude the legislature from enacting a sec-
ond statute if the first one had been invalidated by judicial decision or nullified by referen-
dum." Id.
103. Id. (citing Reapportionment, Op. Leg. Counsel of Cal. No. 5177 (1951), 1 Assembly J.
1796 (1951 Reg. Sess.); 18 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 11, 15 (1951)). See infra note 229.
104. Id. at 672-73, 669 P.2d at 25, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 789 (citing In re Jeanice D., 28 Cal. 3d
210, 216, 617 P.2d 1087, 168 Cal. Rptr. 455 (1980); Perry v. Jordan, 34 Cal. 2d 87, 93, 207
P.2d 47 (1949)). The 1980 constitutional amendment, which proposed to modify and simplify
the constitutional language without changing the meaning, was enacted by Proposition 6.
105. Id. at 673-74, 669 P.2d at 25-27, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 789-90.
106. Id. at 673-74, 699 P.2d at 26, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 790 (citing Lucas v. Colorado Gen.
Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 737 (1964); Hays v. Wood, 25 Cal. 3d 772, 786 n.3, 603 P.2d 19, 25
n.3, 160 Cal. Rptr. 102, 108 n.3 (1979); Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 533, 413 P.2d 825,
828, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881, 884 (1966), affid, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Weaver v. Jordan, 64 Cal. 2d
235, 241, 411 P.2d 289, 293, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537, 541, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 844 (1966); Blotter
v. Farrell, 42 Cal. 2d 804, 810, 270 P.2d 481, 487 (1954); Wallace v. Zinman, 200 Cal. 585,
592, 254 P. 946, 949 (1927); Fair Political Practices Comm'n v. Personnel Bd., 77 Cal. App. 3d
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both the statutory initiative and the legislature's enactments in the same
way. Different treatment of the people's legislative power was not war-
ranted: The constitutional restrictions on legislative power apply with
equal force whether that power is exercised by the people or the legisla-
ture.10 T Since the legislature itself was prohibited from enacting a second
reapportionment, so were the people by statutory initiative. 108
Proponents of the initiative argued in the alternative that even if the
"one apportionment per decade" rule applied to initiatives, the Sebastiani
Initiative should be allowed to remain on the ballot because Plan II was
not yet "effective." 10 9 Proponents argued that Plan II was not yet effec-
tive because it had not yet been used;-that is, no election had been held
under its provisions. Because Plan II was not yet "in effect," they as-
serted that it should not be considered the single valid decennial reappor-
tionment permitted under article XXI of the California Constitution.
Therefore, it could be revised prior to its effective date. The Sebastiani
Initiative, they argued, was the people's attempt to revise Plan II.110 The
court rejected this argument as well."'
Finally, the court addressed the claim that holding the Sebastiani
Initiative unconstitutional would effectively exclude the people from the
reapportionment process and give the legislators uncontrolled power in
an area in which they had a conflict of interest." 2 The majority noted
that the legislature regularly preempted the public in numerous other
52, 56, 143 Cal. Rptr. 393, 396 (1978), disapproved on other grounds, Pacific Legal Found. v.
Brown, 29 Cal. 3d 168, 192, 624 P.2d 1215, 1229, 172 Cal. Rptr. 487, 501 (1981)).
107. Id. at 676-77, 669 P.2d at 28, 194 Cal. Rptr. 792.
108. Id. at 675, 669 P.2d at 26-27, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 790-91. See also 18 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen.
11, 16 (1951) ("after a districting statute has become effective, the lawmaking power of the
state may not make a second revision, whether by means of a legislative enactment or an
initiative statute"). Of course, had the initiative been proposed as an initiative constitutional
amendment which granted authority for the people to enact a second reapportionment law, the
supreme court would have been faced with a different issue.
109. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d at 676-77, 669 P.2d at 28, 194 Cal. Rptr. 792.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 678, 669 P.2d at 29, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 793. The majority found Sloan v.
Donoghue, 20 Cal. 2d 607, 127 P.2d 922 (1942), upon which the proponents relied, inapplica-
ble. In Sloan, the supreme court held that a reapportionment plan was not "effective" at the
time the governor had proclaimed a special election. The election had been called to fill a
vacancy in a congressional seat when the incumbent had died prior to the expiration of his
term. The Sloan court held that the deceased congressman's district boundaries should con-
tinue intact for the remainder of the term. The new reapportionment plan was intended to
apply beginning with the next General Election-it was not "effective" until that time. Id.
The Deukmejian majority limited the Sloan decision to its peculiar facts. Deukmejian, 34
Cal. 3d at 681, 669 P.2d at 33-34, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 797-98. Justice Richardson, dissenting,
must have also recognized the uniqueness of the fact pattern in Sloan because he did not
invoke the effective date argument.
112. 34 Cal. 3d at 678-79, 669 P.2d at 29-30, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 793-94.
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situations. The court suggested that the public's preemption in the reap-
portionment area was not unusual, and probably beneficial. In any
event, the court said, the argument that the public was "preempted" in
this case "is more theoretical than real."11 The court noted that the
congressional reapportionment statute, which had not been enacted as an
urgency measure, had not been challenged by referendum. Neither had
there been a "cognizable" challenge to the declaration of urgency for the
Assembly and Senatorial reapportionment statute. Therefore, no real at-
tempt to directly intervene in the reapportionment process, prior to this
initiative, had been preempted by the legislature.'
4
The court stated that preemption of the people by the legislature
occurs in other contexts and is a feature of the balance between popular
control and representative government reflected in the California Consti-
tution.115 It explained that the fact that the legislature could foreclose
use of a referendum through a declaration of urgency is an inherent fea-
ture of our constitutional system. The majority concluded that "[t]he
existence of this limitation upon the referendum is not a justifiable basis
for extending use of the initiative into areas not permitted by the
Constitution.""1 6
2. The dissent
The dissent in Legislature v. Deukmejian" 7 first took issue with the
majority's decision to hear a challenge to the Sebastiani Initiative prior to
the election."' In Justice Richardson's view, it did not meet the "thresh-
old rule of deference to the people's franchise," the "clear showing of
invalidity."'" 9 In fact, the measure was plainly constitutional and valid,
Justice Richardson said, citing an opinion to that effect by the Legislative
Counsel.'10 Even if the majority had grave doubts as to the constitution-
ality of the initiative measure, the dissent argued, a determination of its
validity prior to its submission to the electorate is not compelled. 2 In
113. Id. at 680 n.18, 669 P.2d at 30 n.18, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 794 n.18.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 680, 669 P.2d at 30, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 794. Preemption occurs, the court said, in
cases of immediate expenditures of funds, for example, and in a number of other legislative
actions that "cannot effectively be undone by a subsequent initiative measure and that can be
prevented, if at all, only by referendum." Id. at 679-80, 669 P.2d at 30, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 794.
116. Id. at 680, 669 P.2d at 30, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 794.
117. Justice Richardson was the sole dissenter.
118. Id. at 681, 669 P.2d at 33-34, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 797-98 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
119. Id. (Richardson, J., dissenting).
120. Id. (Richardson, J., dissenting) (citing Op. Leg. Counsel of Cal. (1983)).
121. Id. at 681, 669 P.2d at 34, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 798 (Richardson, J., dissenting) (citing
Gayle v. Hamm, 25 Cal. App. 3d 250, 256, 101 Cal. Rptr. 628, 633 (1972)).
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Justice Richardson's view, neither "clear invalidity" nor "grave doubts"
had been demonstrated.
Justice Richardson was also critical of the majority's discussion of
factors such as cost and election disruption as the basis for preelection
determination of the controversy. Justice Richardson argued that "[a]s a
matter of principle, the financial cost of the election should be entirely
irrelevant to the legal issue before us." '122 He noted that such costs are
incurred for every special election, yet do not provide a basis for preelec-
tion review. Moreover, as to the disruptive effect on election schedule
deadlines, the court had previously exercised its equitable powers to
waive or extend deadlines to assure an orderly conduct of the election.123
Like the majority, Justice Richardson based his position on his view
of the strength of the one apportionment per decade prohibition. 24 Not-
ing that the state constitution contained no express prohibition against a
second reapportionment,'25  he distinguished the Wheeler 126  and
Dowell127 cases relied upon by the majority. Justice Richardson ex-
plained that Wheeler was decided before the constitutional provisions for
the initiative and referendum power were adopted. 2  Therefore, its one
apportionment per decade rule could apply only to actions of the legisla-
ture. Similarly, Justice Richardson concluded that Dowell, by its own
terms, applied only to legislative acts, as it relied "wholly on former arti-
cle IV, section 6, which is confined exclusively to the Legislature's au-
thority."' 129 If the public had wanted to place this restriction on the
initiative power as well, they would have expressly included such lan-
guage in the 1980 amendments to the reapportionment provisions, when
article XXI was substituted for former article IV, section 6.130
The dissent argued that Yorty v. Ahderson '3' made it clear that the
"once-every-decade" principle was not absolute even as to the legislature
122. Id. at 682, 669 P.2d at 34, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 798 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
123. Id. (Richardson, J., dissenting) (citing Assembly v. Deukmejian, 30 Cal. 3d 638, 678-
79, 639 P.2d 939, 964, 180 Cal. Rptr. 297, 322, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 456 U.S, 941
(1982); Legislature v. Reinecke, 10 Cal. 3d 396, 406-07, 516 P.2d 6, 12-13, 110 Cal. Rptr. 718,
724-25 (1973)).
124. Id. at 686-87, 669 P.2d at 37, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 801 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
125. Id. (Richardson, 3., dissenting). See also supra note 95 and accompanying text.
126. 152 Cal. 224, 92 P. 353 (1907). See supra note 98.
127. 199 Cal. 144, 248 P. 511 (1926). See supra note 98.
128. 34 Cal. 3d at 687, 669 P.2d at 38, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 802 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
Wheeler was decided in 1907. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 6, providing for the initiative and refer-
endum power, was enacted in 1911.
129. 34 Cal. 3d at 687, 669 P.2d at 38, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 802 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 688, 669 P.2d at 38, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 802 (Richardson, J., dissenting).




where the previous reapportionment had been invalidated or nullified. 3 2
Thus, if the existing plan was no longer valid, even the legislature was
not restricted by the one apportionment per decade rule.'33 On this point
the majority and dissenting opinions agreed. Where they parted com-
pany, however, was on the question whether the existing plan could be
changed again by the initiative.
Recognizing that Plan II was made necessary only by the earlier
public rejection of Plan I, Justice Richardson questioned the seemingly
illogical result of the majority's decision. "If the people can, as here,
indirectly through referendum, mandate the Legislature to adopt a sec-
ond reapportionment plan within the same decennial census period, why
may not the same people, directly through the initiative achieve the same
result?""13
Justice Richardson claimed that the application of the one appor-
tionment per decade rule had the effect of freeing the legislature from the
restraints which the majority had imposed upon the people themselves.
But, he asserted, "there is no reason to hold that the people's power is
more limited than that of the Legislature .... Surely, if... the constitu-
tional power of the people is not paramount, it cannot be less than that of
their own creation, the Legislature."' 35 He concluded that the majority
opinion would make it just that.
Justice Richardson saw the controversy in broad constitutional
terms. He criticized the majority holding as founded upon a "technical
argument" based on a dubious interpretation of article XXI of the consti-
tution, the article dealing with reapportionment. He argued that the ma-
jority's position was a misconception of the true constitutional origin of
the people's right to reapportiofi. Justice Richardson explained that the
right to redistrict the state by initiative did not come from any grant of
power originating in article XXI, but rather from the reservation of all
political and legislative power to the people contained in article II and
article IV. In other words, it was not the provisions relating to reappor-
tionment that gave the people this right, but that part of the constitution
describing the power of initiative and referendum. 136 Based upon the
132. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d at 687, 669 P.2d at 38, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 802 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
133. Id. (Richardson, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 687-88, 669 P.2d at 38, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 802 (Richardson, J., dissenting) (em-
phasis in original).
135. Id. at 688, 699 P.2d at 38, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 802 (Richardson, J., dissenting) (quoting
Fair Political Practices Comm'n v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 33, 42, 599 P.2d 46, 51, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 855, 860 (1979)).
136. Id. at 687, 669 P.2d at 38, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 801 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
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court's traditional insistence that "an initiative is entitled to very special
and very favored treatment," any reasonable doubts should be resolved in
support of the initiative.
137
In Justice Richardson's view, the reapportionment struggle revealed
why, from a policy standpoint, it is so essential that the people retain
their constitutional initiative power over reapportionment, even if both a
legislative and an initiative plan have been adopted in the same census
period.
If the people are denied any right to approve or disapprove a
blatantly gerrymandered reapportionment plan, then there is
absolutely no check on the Legislature's abuse of power. The
concept of a Legislature perpetuating its tenure by devising a
reapportionment plan wholly immune from review or revision
by the people themselves is dangerous and repugnant to consti-
tutional principles.
131
Finally, Justice Richardson cautioned,
[w]hile the initiative and referendum may not fit into a given
philosopher's democratic model, and while these powers may,
like any others, be misused from time to time, one would hope
the courts will not fall prey to the elitist argument that the peo-
ple do not know what is best for them and therefore need some-
one else to tell them.
139
B. AFL-CIO v. Eu
The question presented to the court in AFL-CIO v. Eu 140 was simi-
lar to the question presented in Legislature v. Deukmejian :141 whether
an initiative measure which had secured the required number of signa-
tures could be validly placed on the ballot. Eu involved a challenge to
137. Id. at 683, 669 P.2d at 25, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 799 (Richardson, J., dissenting) (emphasis
in original).
138. Id. at 690, 669 P.2d at 40, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 804 (Richardson, J., dissenting). As
Justice Richardson said:
This is but the latest chapter in a very unhappy period in California political
history. Realignment of voting boundaries, congressional and legislative, has become
so volatile, so heavily laced with partisan wrangling and self-interest, that the peri-
odic process has become something painfully to be endured. This has been going on
for years. Doubtless there must be a better way. However, it is not for a court to
fashion one, but rather for the people, groping for some equitable resolution, to
choose the appropriate alternative.
Id. at 685, 669 P.2d at 36, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 800 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 691, 669 P.2d at 40, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 804 (Richardson, J., dissenting) (quoting
Comment, Scope of the Initiative, supra note 6, at 1747-48).
140. 36 Cal. 3d 687, 686 P.2d 609, 206 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1984).
141. 34 Cal. 3d 658, 669 P.2d 17, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983).
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the proposed balanced federal budget initiative sponsored by Lewis K.
Uhler. Uhler was an activist Republican citizen tax reformer in the style
of Howard Jarvis, and the head of the National Tax Limitation Commit-
tee. The balanced federal budget initiative also received the active sup-
port of the California Republican Party.
Frustrated by the numerous unsuccessful attempts to pass a bal-
anced budget amendment resolution through the Democratically-
controlled legislature, this proposal sought to circumvent the legislature
via the initiative process. The Balanced Federal Budget (BFB) Initiative,
like the Sebastiani Initiative, was proposed as an initiative statute. Like
the Sebastiani proposal, this proposal sought to achieve by initiative what
it could not achieve through legislation.
The BFB initiative called for a national constitutional convention
for the sole and limited purpose of proposing an amendment to the
United States Constitution.142 The proposed amendment would require
142. The Balanced Federal Budget Initiative read, in relevant part, as follows:
"INMATIVE MEASURE TO BE SUBMrrrED DIRECTLY TO THE VOTERS
Section One. (a) The People of the State of California hereby mandate that the
California Legislature adopt the following resolution and submit the same to the
Congress of the United States under the provisions of Article V of the Constitution of
the United States:
That the Congress of the United States is urged to propose and submit to the
several states an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to require, with
certain exceptions, that the federal budget be balanced; and
That application is hereby made to the Congress of the United States, pursuant
to Article V of the Constitution of the United States, to call a convention for the sole
purpose of proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to re-
quire, with certain exceptions, that the federal budget be balanced; and
If the Congress of the United States proposes an amendment to the Constitution
of the United States identical in subject matter to that contained herein and submits
same to the States for ratification, this application shall no longer be of any force and
effect; and
This application shall be deemed null and void, rescinded and of no effect in the
event that such convention not be limited to such specific and exclusive purposes;
and
This application constitutes a continuing application in accordance with Article
V of the Constitution of the United States until at least two-thirds of the several
States have made similar applications pursuant to Article V of the United States
Constitution;
(b) The Secretary of the Senate is hereby directed to transmit copies of this
application, upon its adoption by the California Legislature, to the President and
Secretary of the United States Senate and the Speaker and Clerk of the House of
Representatives of the Congress of the United States.
Section Two. The following is added to sections 8901 through 8903 and sec-
tion 9320 of the Government Code and shall modify, amend or control any other
laws or regulations of the State of California similar in subject matter, heretofore or
hereinafter enacted:
... If the California Legislature fails to adopt the resolution set forth in Section
One of [this] initiative measure and submit same to the Congress of the United
States, as required therein, on or before the end of the twentieth (20th) legislative day
after approval by the people of the said initiative measure, or if the legislature ad-
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the federal budget to be balanced by the year 1995. The initiative would
propose the balanced budget amendment in alternative and dramatic
ways. Section One required the California Legislature to adopt a resolu-
tion which would (1) urge Congress to propose a balanced budget
amendment and (2) apply to Congress to call a convention for that pur-
pose pursuant to article V of the United States Constitution.
43
Section Two of the proposed initiative would withhold all salary,
benefits, expenses and perquisites to all members of the legislature if the
journs or recesses during the regular session prior to the twentieth (20th) legislative
day without adopting said resolution, or having adopted same, repeals, rescinds, nul-
lifies or contradicts said resolution, all payments, compensation, benefits, expenses,
perquisites and any other payments to any member of the California Legislature
made pursuant to this Section shall be suspended as to each and every legislator until
such time as the California Legislature adopts such resolution ....
Section Three. (a) The people of the State of California hereby adopt the reso-
lution set forth in Section One of this initiative measure; and (b) If the California
Legislature fails to adopt the resolution set forth in Section One of this initiative
measure within forty (40) legislative days of the approval of this initiative measure,
the Secretary of State of California shall transmit the resolution adopted pursuant to
this Section to the President and Secretary of the United States Senate and the
Speaker and Clerk of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United
States.
Section Four. [Limits legislative amendment of the initiative.]
Section Five. If any section or subsection of this initiative or the aforemen-
tioned resolution shall be held invalid, the remainder of the initiative and the afore-
mentioned resolution, to the extent they can be given effect, or the application of
such provision to persons or circumstances other than those as to which it is held
invalid, shall not be affected thereby, and to this end the provisions of this chapter
are severable."
36 Cal. 3d at 692-94, 686 P.2d at 612-13, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 92-93 (quoting Balanced Federal
Budget Initiative).
143. See supra note 142. Article V of the United States Constitution provides, in relevant
part:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the Legislatures
of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amend-
ments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this
Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States,
or by conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratifica-
tion may be proposed by Congress ....
U.S. CONST. art. V.
At the time of the decision in Eu, 32 of the necessary 34 states had applied to Congress,
pursuant to article V of the United States Constitution, to call a convention for the purpose of
enacting a balanced budget amendment. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d at 692, 686 P.2d at 611-12, 206 Cal.
Rptr. at 91-92.
It is interesting to note that each of the 26 amendments to the Constitution to date have
been proposed by Congress. None has been proposed by constitutional convention. Although
there have been many attempts to call a convention, each attempt fell short of the necessary
two-thirds approval among the states. Twenty-five of the 26 amendments were ratified by the
states; the 21st amendment was ratified by state conventions. Id. at 691, 686 P.2d at 611, 206
Cal. Rptr. at 91.
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legislature did not pass the resolution proposed in Section One.
144
In Section Three the same resolution was proposed and adopted by
an affirmative vote of the people, with instructions to the Secretary of
State to transmit the resolution to Congress if the legislature failed to do
so within forty days. The initiative also contained provisions prohibiting
a legislative amendment of its terms and providing for severability of
each of the substantive sections.
145
In March, 1984, Secretary of State March Fong Eu certified that the
measure had received enough signatures to qualify for a place on the
General Election ballot in November, 1984. Meanwhile, the idea of a
balanced budget amendment had garnered an impressive list of adversa-
ries. 141 The organizations and individuals opposed to the initiative filed
an original action in the California Supreme Court for a writ of mandate
to enjoin the Secretary of State from expending any funds or taking any
action to place the measure on the ballot. 47 The supreme court sched-
uled a special hearing to decide the matter before any money would be
spent for the election. As it had done one year earlier in Deukmejian, the
court issued a writ enjoining the election.
148
1. The majority opinion
Justice Broussard, writing for the majority in AFL-CIO v. Eu,49
first considered why it was again necessary for the court to determine the
validity of an initiative prior to a vote of the people. 150 Citing the court's
decision in Deukmejian,' he offered a more careful explanation of the
144. See supra note 142.
145. See supra note 142.
146. Petitioners were a veritable politician's dream of interest groups:
American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations; American Associa-
tion of University Women, California State Division; American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
of Northern California; ACLU Foundation of Southern California; American Federation of
State, County and Municipal Employees; American Jewish Committee; Americans United for
Separation of Church and State; B'nai B'rith International; General Board of Church and
Society, United Methodist Church; National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People, Inc.; National Conference of Catholic Charities; National Council of La Raza; Na-
tional Council of Senior Citizens; National Farmers Union; National Organization for Wo-
men; Office for Church in Society, United Church of Christ; Service Employees International
Union and several individuals. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d at 694 n.7, 686 P.2d at 613 n.7, 206 Cal. Rptr.
at 93 n.7.
147. Id. at 694, 686 P.2d at 613, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
148. Id. at 716, 686 P.2d at 629, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
149. The majority opinion was signed by Chief Justice Bird and Justices Mosk, Reynoso
and Grodin. Justice Kraus wrote a separate concurring opinion and Justice Lucas was the sole
dissenter.
150. Id. at 695-97, 686 P.2d at 614-15, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 94-95.
151. See supra notes 90-116 and accompanying text.
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court's new rule on preelection review.152
Justice Broussard cited the separate concurrence of Justice Mosk in
Brosnahan v. Eu 153 for the general rule that "inhibiting preelection re-
view 'applies only to the contention that an initiative is unconstitutional
because of its substance. If it is determined that the electorate does not
have the power to adopt the proposal in the first instance.., the measure
must be excluded from the ballot.' ,"154 The majority went on to note
that "the challenge goes to the power of the electorate to adopt the pro-
posal in the first instance .... The question raised is, in a sense, jurisdic-
tional." '155 Since the present action challenged the power of the people to
propose the initiative in the first instance, the court concluded that pree-
lection review was appropriate. The court further reasoned that an inva-
lid initiative would steal time, attention and money from the valid
measures on the ballot. Moreover, a post-hoc determination would en-
gender voter confusion and frustration and result in the overall degenera-
tion of the initiative process.1 56
In justifying the majority's position, Justice Broussard first had to
leap the hurdle presented by the amicus curiae briefs of former United
States Attorney General Griffin Bell, former Senator Sam Ervin and Pro-
fessor John Noonan. These amici contended that none of the federal
issues was justiciable; the amending process described in article V of the
United States Constitution is entirely political in nature. The issue
presented was a political question to be left to Congress.5- 7 Justice
Broussard determined that the political question doctrine of Coleman v.
Miller 58 was not controlling in light of later cases under article V.'5 9
All that was needed, he asserted, was judicial construction of the provi-
152. 36 Cal. 3d at 695, 686 P.2d at 614, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 94 (citing Legislature v.
Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 669 P.2d 17, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983)).
153. 31 Cal. 3d 1, 6, 641 P.2d 200, 202, 181 Cal. Rptr. 100, 102 (1982) (Mosk, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
154. 36 Cal. 3d at 695, 686 P.2d at 614, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 94 (1984) (quoting Brosnahan v.
Eu, 31 Cal. 3d 1, 6, 641 P.2d 200, 202, 181 Cal. Rptr. 100, 102 (1982) (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting)).
155. Id. at 696, 686 P.2d at 614, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 94 (citing Legislature v. Deukmejian, 34
Cal. 3d 658, 667, 669 P.2d 17, 21, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781, 785 (1983)).
156. Id. at 696-97, 686 P.2d at 614-15, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 94-95.
157. Id. at 697-98, 686 P.2d at 615-16, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 95-96.
158. 307 U.S. 433 (1939). In Coleman, the United States Supreme Court refused to rule on
the validity of Kansas' ratification of a proposed Child Labor Amendment, holding that it was
a political question within the exclusive authority of Congress and hence, non-justiciable. Id.
at 450-51.
159. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d at 698-99, 686 P.2d at 616-17, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 96-97 (citing Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Dyer v. Blair, 390 F.
Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ill. 1975)).
1074
CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE
sions of that article. He concluded that the federal issues were indeed
justiciable. 60
The court then turned to the issues which made the BFB Initiative
invalid. Justice Broussard first addressed the conflict between the initia-
tive and article V of the United States Constitution. He pointed out that
article V specifies that "the Legislatures of two thirds of the several
states" 161 were to apply to Congress for a convention. No reported case
had expressly determined whether application could be made by initia-
tive. Two earlier decisions, however, had ruled that the use of the word
"Legislatures" in the context of amendment ratification excluded direct
referendum action by the people. 162 A later opinion of the California
Attorney General had similarly concluded that amendments to the fed-
eral Constitution are not subject to the initiative or referendum process
in California. 6 ' The Eu court thus concluded that the BFB Initiative's
direct application to Congress for a constitutional convention was invalid
under article V.1
The court then turned to the compulsory provisions of the BFB Ini-
tiative. Section Two of the proposal called for a suspension of legislative
pay and benefits if the application to Congress was not approved. 65 The
mandatory provisions were challenged as violative of both article V of
the United States Constitution and article II of the California Constitu-
tion. The court noted that the issue presented was one of first
impression.'
66
Against similar challenges, a 1922 United States Supreme Court de-
cision had upheld the ratification of the nineteenth amendment to the
federal Constitution by the states of Missouri and Tennessee. 67 Both
Missouri and Tennessee had provisions in their state constitutions which
restricted the right of the state legislature to ratify the amendment.
160. Id. at 699, 686 P.2d at 617, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 97.
161. U.S. CONST. art. V (emphasis added). See supra note 143.
162. Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920); Barlotti v. Lyons, 182 Cal. 575, 189 P. 282
(1920). In Hawke, the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional a provision of the
Ohio Constitution which declared that legislative ratification of a federal constitutional amend-
ment was incomplete until approved by popular referendum. 253 U.S. at 231.
In Barlotti, the California Supreme Court struck down a referendum petition which at-
tempted to force a popular vote on the legislature's resolution which approved the eighteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution. The court held that the legislature's ratification
was conclusive under article V of the United States Constitution. 182 Cal. at 583, 189 P. at
285.
163. 58 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 830 (1975).
164. 36 Cal. 3d at 703, 686 P.2d at 622, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
165. See supra note 142.
166. 36 Cal. 3d at 704, 686 P.2d at 622, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
167. Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922).
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When the legislatures in each state nevertheless ratified the nineteenth
amendment, the ratifications were challenged as being violative of those
state constitutional provisions. The Supreme Court held that the ratifica-
tion action by a state "is a federal function derived from the Federal
Constitution and it transcends any limitations sought to be imposed by
the people of a State."' 68 Thus, Justice Broussard in Eu concluded that
since a state cannot constitutionally prohibit a legislature from proposing
or ratifying a constitutional amendment, by implication it cannot compel
the legislature to do so.' 69
The court then turned to the issue of whether the BFB Initiative was
valid under the California Constitution. The majority concluded that the
provisions of article II limited the initiative power to the adoption or
rejection of statutes.7  A statute does not include a resolution, which is
not a law but merely expresses the wishes of the legislature. 171 The re-
served powers of initiative and referendum do not encompass all possible
action of a legislative body. Thus, although it was proposed as an initia-
tive statute, the BFB Initiative was actually a resolution and beyond the
powers of the people to enact by initiative. The initiative power did not
extend to resolutions which merely declared policy or entreated action,
since such enactments did not constitute the exercise of legislative power
to create statutory law.'
72
Although the court admitted that the distinction between an initia-
tive which enacts a statute and one which commands the legislature to do
so is "a narrow one," '173 the court found the distinction constitutionally
significant. In effect, the court declared that the people could not com-
mand the legislature to do that which the people could not do
themselves.174
2. The dissent
In answer to the majority's declaration of the initiative's invalidity,
the dissent by Justice Lucas' 75 called for broad and expansive construc-
tion of the initiative power. In Justice Lucas' view, the majority, "acting
168. Id. at 137.
169. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d at 704, 686 P.2d at 622, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
170. Id. at 708, 686 P.2d at 623, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
171. Id. at 712 n.23, 686 P.2d at 626 n.23, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 106 n.23.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 714, 686 P.2d at 627, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
174. Id.
175. Newly appointed Associate Justice Malcolm Lucas filled the shoes of retired Justice




both precipitously and prematurely, ha[d] once again deprived the sover-
eign people of their precious initiative right." '17 6 They erred, he said, in
at least three respects.
First, Justice Lucas argued against the decision to review the initia-
tive prior to an election as contrary to the long established precedent of
deferring judicial review. He called it "a disturbing trend of this court to
reach out and prematurely decide constitutional issues which might have
been rendered entirely moot by the results of the forthcoming election,
and which in any event readily could be addressed after the election has
been held."1 7 Justice Lucas also cited the beneficial aspects of public
debate on the balanced budget issue, as well as the political question doc-
trine, as reasons for deferring a decision on the merits.17
Second, Justice Lucas took issue with the holding that article V of
the United States Constitution required the court to invalidate this mea-
sure. He distinguished this case from Hawke v. Smith 17 9 and Barlotti v.
Lyons, 180 in which the question was whether a vote of the people could
undo aprior legislative act. The concern of article V, that the application
process be made by a state legislature, was entirely satisfied by the BFB
Initiative.1 81 Here, the initiative process was being used to assure that
the application to Congress finally would be undertaken by the
legislature.
Third, Justice Lucas disagreed that the initiative was invalid under
the California Constitution. He sharply criticized the majority's determi-
nation that the measure was not considered a statute and asked:
Would it have made any difference if our measure had recited
that its text would be formally incorporated into a new section
of the Government Code? Surely such formalism cannot pre-
vail over the people's right to be heard on matters of grave im-
portance to them. Indeed, our prior cases require us to resolve
all doubts in favor of the exercise of the initiative power, espe-
cially where the subject matter of the measure is of public inter-
est and concern.
1 8 2
The dissent accused the majority of applying an overly narrow con-
176. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d at 717, 686 P.2d at 629, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 109 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 717-18, 686 P.2d at 630, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 110 (Lucas, J., dissenting) (emphasis
in original).
178. Id. at 718-19, 686 P.2d at 630-31, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 110-11 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
179. 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
180. 182 Cal. 575, 189 P. 282 (1920).
181. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d at 719-20, 686 P.2d at 631-32, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 111-12 (Lucas, J.,
dissenting).
182. Id. at 722, 686 P.2d at 633, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 113 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
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struction of the scope of the initiative power. According to Justice Lu-
cas, such a narrow construction "is directly contrary to the teachings of
prior decisions... which require a liberal construction favoring the exer-
cise of the initiative power." ' He felt that the initiative, unlike the lim-
ited referendum power, is not confined by any state constitutional
restrictions upon its scope or use. Nothing in the state constitution for-
bids use of the initiative power to direct the legislature to apply for a
constitutional convention, he pointed out.184
Finally, Justice Lucas would have held the initiative severable as to
its various sections. The severability provision within the initiative itself
led him to "see no reason why the initiative may not be given effect, at
least to the extent it directs the legislature to apply for a constitutional
convention."
18 5
IV. LIMITATIONS ON THE INITIATIVE POWER: A CRITIQUE
The questions presented in Legislature v. Deukmejian I'6 and AFL-
CIO v. Eu,18 7 thrust the California Supreme Court squarely into the
political process. It is not surprising that the decisions were ultimately
political ones. A legal realist explanation of the Deukmejian and Eu de-
cisions would focus upon the political background of each justice and
their ties to the Democratic Party. To be sure, the decisions in both cases
were split along partisan lines."8
The reapportionment plan challenged by the Sebastiani Initiative
was designed to maintain the incumbents in office and retain the Demo-
183. Id. at 720-21, 686 P.2d at 632, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 112 (Lucas, J., dissenting) (emphasis
in original) (citing Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557
P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976); Gayle v. Hamm, 25 Cal. App. 3d 250, 101 Cal. Rptr. 628
(1972); Mervynne v. Acker, 189 Cal. App. 2d 558, 11 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1961); Martin v. Smith,
176 Cal. App. 2d 115, 1 Cal. Rptr. 307 (1959)).
184. Id. at 722, 686 P.2d at 633, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 113 (Lucas, J., dissenting). See CAL.
CONST. art. II, §§ 8-9.
185. 36 Cal. 3d at 723, 686 P.2d at 634, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 114 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
186. 34 Cal. 3d 658, 669 P.2d 17, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983). See supra notes 65-139 and
accompanying text.
187. 36 Cal. 3d 687, 686 P.2d 609, 206 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1984). See supra notes 140-85 and
accompanying text.
188. The six justices voting in the majority in each case are all Democrats and all were
appointed by Democratic governors: Chief Justice Bird and Justices Broussard, Grodin, Kaus
and Reynoso were appointed by Democratic Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Justice
Mosk was appointed by Democratic Governor Edmund G. Brown, Sr. Justice Richardson, a
Republican appointed by Republican Governor Ronald Reagan, was the sole dissenter in Leg-
islature v. Deukmejian. Justice Lucas, a Republican appointed by Republican Governor
George Deukmejian, was the sole dissenter in AFL-CIO v. Eu. See K. ARNOLD, CALIFORNIA
COURTS AND JUDGES HANDBOOK (4th ed. 1985).
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cratic control of the legislature. The challenged plan had been created
only after the previous plan had been rejected by the public. And, it was
created by legislators who had been elected from districts rejected by the
public.
The Sebastiani Initiative, conversely, would have given an electoral
advantage to the Republicans. It was a blatant attempt by Republican
activists to achieve political advantage through the initiative after that
success had proven elusive at the polls. Throughout the course of the
reapportionment process, neither the Republicans nor the Democrats
had exhibited any example of civic responsibility. The Sebastiani Initia-
tive, and the Deukmejian lawsuit which resulted, were nothing less than
a struggle for political control of the California Legislature.
Similarly, in Eu, the partisan battle was a familiar one. The bal-
anced budget proposal is a traditional favorite of the Republican Party.
It is usually opposed by Democrats, who see it as a mechanism for cut-
ting social programs. Again, the partisan division on the court can ex-
plain the six to one vote against allowing the initiative to proceed.
Faced with a novel question in each case, the majority based their
opinions on narrow and technical grounds. In Deukmejian, the applica-
tion of the one apportionment per decade rule, when the public was
barred from challenging Plan II by referendum, is highly questionable.
The political history of the challenged plan, and in particular, the legisla-
tive maneuvering that preempted participation of the public in the reap-
portionment process, casts the decision in a revealing light. The
Deukmejian court, after all, applied the one apportionment per decade
rule to uphold a second reapportionment (Plan II) in the same decade,
against the repeal provisions of a third reapportionment (Plan III).
In Eu, the supreme court again read the initiative provisions very
narrowly to bar the initiative from an entire area of legislative policy
making. The court further declined to recognize the BFB Initiative as a
statute because it was directed at the legislature and not the public at
large. The court imposed an artificial and overly restrictive interpreta-
tion of the initiative power in complete disregard of its populist origins.
In contrast, the dissenters in both Deukmejian and Eu would have de-
cided the cases upon a broad and expansive interpretation of the consti-
tutional provisions for initiatives.
The supreme court's willingness to intervene in these highly
politicized cases and to become embroiled in partisan controversies is
surprising. The court's option for an early, preelection determination of
the merits is a clear change in judicial policy. But the court's new policy
on preelection judicial intervention is only part of a change in attitude
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toward the initiative. The supreme court expressed its doubt that an ini-
tiative can validly be used to enact a reapportionment plan. Similarly,
resolutions, as a form of expressing the people's will, have now been de-
clared off limits to the people through the initiative. For the first time,
the California Supreme Court has begun an overt substantive review of
the broad initiative power. In both Deukmejian and Eu, the groundwork
has been laid for future courts to place new substantive limits on the
initiative power.
A. Preelection Review of Initiatives
In asserting that a preelection review of the challenge to the Sebas-
tiani Initiative was justified, the majority in Legislature v. Deukmejian
correctly stated the rule of a long line of precedent, but did not correctly
apply it. The rule expressed in Brosnahan v. Eu "9 is that it is more
appropriate to review challenges after an election in the absence of some
clear showing of invalidity of the ballot measure in question. 190 In other
words, it is not a "clear showing of invalidity" that will cause the re-
moval of an initiative measure from the ballot, but rather such a showing
is necessary to trigger judicial intervention. Without a "clear showing of
invalidity," the court should not sustain such a challenge. 191
The threshold test for judicial review as applied by the Deukmejian
court, in effect, required it first to determine the constitutional validity of
the measure and then decide whether it should be reviewed. Given this
approach, the court's observation-that, having determined its invalid-
ity, "[t]here seems little reason in law or in policy for keeping that con-
clusion a secret" 192  until after the election-makes some sense.
Although the court's approach may have some beneficial aspects, it rep-
resents a significant change from prior law.
193
Instead of correctly applying the "clear showing of invalidity" test,
the majority offered several reasons why early determination of the issue
would be beneficial.194 But, as pointed out by the dissent, considerations
of potential disruption and cost are clearly inappropriate as a rationale
189. 31 Cal. 3d 1, 641 P.2d 200, 181 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1982).
190. Id. at 4, 641 P.2d at 202, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
191. Id.
192. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d at 667, 669 P.2d at 21, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 785.
193. See Comment, Judicial Intervention in the Preelection Stage of the Initiative Process: A
Change in Policy by the California Supreme Court, 15 PAC. L.J. 1127 (1984) [hereinafter cited
as Comment, Judicial Intervention]; Note, Preelection Judicial Review: Taking the Initiative in
Voter Protection, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1216 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Preelection Judicial
Review].
194. 34 Cal. 3d at 665-67, 669 P.2d at 21-22, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 784-85.
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for early judicial intervention. The high cost of a statewide special elec-
tion may be a valid argument against the initiative process itself. Indeed,
a similar rationale could be advanced for early judicial review of all initi-
ative measures, whether or not subject to a legal challenge. Such a re-
view would have the beneficial effect of avoiding a "needless"
expenditure of funds by opponents wishing to defeat the measure, if a
review were to unearth some constitutional defect and result in
invalidation.'
In Deukmejian, the potentially disruptive effect of the Sebastiani Ini-
tiative was a matter of at least some doubt. The argument appears more
likely motivated by political considerations than by legal ones. The
Democratic leadership of the Senate and Assembly, at whom the Sebas-
tiani Initiative was aimed, had refused to allow the measure to be placed
on the November municipal ballot.' 96 The previous year, in Assembly v.
Deukmejian,97 the supreme court had taken notice of the fact that the
Secretary of State had instructed county election officials to be prepared
to conduct an election under alternative sets of reapportionment plans.
In this way, officials would be able to meet all of the election deadlines,
regardless of which plan the court chose.198 The majority did not discuss
why a similar approach would not be appropriate in the Sebastiani Initia-
tive situation.
Likewise there was no examination of the possibly partisan motives
of the Secretary of State in asserting the disruption the initiative would
cause. The rationale offered by the majority thus seems insufficient to
make early judicial review appropriate. Neither consideration reaches
the "clear invalidity" test.
A correct application of the "clear invalidity" test requires that the
initiative must be unconstitutional on its face in order to trigger judicial
intervention. As the majority admitted, the Sebastiani attempt to reap-
portion legislative and congressional districts through the initiative pro-
cess was novel in the history of California. 199 But while Deukmejian was
a case of first impression at the supreme court, an appellate court ruled a
similar attempt to reapportion local supervisorial districts by initiative
195. Surprisingly, such an argument has been made with just this justification. See Note,
Preelection Judicial Review, supra note 193, at 1233.
196. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d at 682, 669 P.2d at 34, 194 Cal. Rptr. 798 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
197. 30 Cal. 3d 638, 639 P.2d 939, 180 Cal. Rptr. 297, cert denied and appeal dismissed,
456 U.S. 941 (1982).
198. Id. at 645, 639 P.2d at 943, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 301.
199. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d at 663, 669 P.2d at 18, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
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was constitutional in Ortiz v. Madera County Board of Supervisors.2
The Ortiz decision indicates that an attempt to reapportion by initiative
on the state level is, at least, not clearly invalid. In Deukmejian, there
was enough precedent demonstrating the measure's validity that preelec-
tion judicial review was inappropriate.
The Deukmejian majority characterized the challenge to the initia-
tive as "jurisdictional."201 The court said that the challenge "goes to the
power of the electorate to adopt the proposal in the first instance."2 "2
Although called a "jurisdictional" limitation on the initiative power, the
majority ruling in reality created a substantive limitation on the statewide
initiative. Such a limitation represents the first time the statewide initia-
tive power has been narrowed in this way and represents a significant
break with precedent.20 3 The previous judicial limitations on the initia-
tive could be characterized as procedural in nature.204
The majority's approach in Deukmejian belies the confusion in this
area and the need for clearer standards of judicial review. Ideally, these
standards would strike a balance between competing considerations. On
the one hand, voters should be protected from confusion and deception,
illegal attempts to qualify an initiative or false expectations from clearly
unconstitutional measures. On the other hand, the judicial system
should be shielded from unnecessary or excessive involvement in political
questions and the wrath of voters angered by a determination that a pop-
ular measure was invalid. An early review of initiatives, prior to the offi-
cial certification for signature circulation, would be clearly preferable to
the present confused approach. If confined to procedural matters, such a
review would enhance rather than restrict the initiative power, leaving
time for the initiative proponents to correct whatever procedural fault
had been identified.
B. The "One Apportionment Per Decade" Rule in Deukmejian
The principal challenge to the Sebastiani Initiative in Legislature v.
Deukmejian was that it unconstitutionally attempted to reapportion leg-
islative and congressional districts a second time after the decennial fed-
200. 107 Cal. App. 3d 866, 166 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1980).
201. 34 Cal. 3d at 667, 669 P.2d at 21, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 785.
202. Id.
203. See generally Comment, Judicial Intervention, supra note 193. See also Note, Preelec-
tion Judicial Review, supra note 193, at 1226.
204. See infra notes 43-62 and accompanying text. See also Note, Preelection Judicial Re-
view, supra note 193, at 1228. But see Gayle v. Hamm, 25 Cal. App. 3d 250, 256-57, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 628, 633-34 (1972) (suggesting that the court's exercise of its "equitable discretion"
would permit it to reach and decide constitutional issues before the election).
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eral census.2z 5 The state and federal constitutions, petitioners argued,
allow only one valid reapportionment per decade.20 6 But the rule upon
which the court based its holding has dubious origins.
While conceding an express basis for this claim could not be found
in either the state or the federal Constitutions, the majority relied on two
cases, Wheeler v. Herbert2 0 7 and Dowell v. McLees.20 8 But both Wheeler
and Dowell are not applicable to the Sebastiani Initiative because neither
involved the initiative process. The dissent in Deukmejian saw both
Wheeler and Dowell as inapplicable to the present case. Justice Richard-
son noted that heeler was decided prior to the placement of the initia-
tive power in the constitution.209 The court in Dowell, as in Wheeler,
spoke only of the legislature being constrained and made no reference to
the initiative power.210 Furthermore, in neither decision is there any in-
dication that the legislature was consciously attempting to reapportion a
second time. In both decisions the change in district boundaries ap-
peared to be inadvertent and incidental.
There is a third objection to the use of the Wheeler and Dowell deci-
sions as precedent. The Dowell and Wheeler courts did not need to reach
the "one apportionment per decade" issue. Article IV of the California
Constitution, as originally drafted, only placed constraints on the legisla-
ture in forming legislative districts.211 Since the statutes at issue in
Wheeler and Dowell were not enacted for the purpose of forming legisla-
tive districts, but rather to adjust the boundaries of political subdivisions,
it is questionable whether article IV should even apply to those cases.
Therefore, in Wheeler and Dowell, the legislature should have been per-
mitted to make an incidental change in a legislative district through a
change in political boundaries. Absent a direct inconsistency between
constitutional provisions, courts should interpret the provisions in a
manner that avoids potential inconsistency. 22 Since the rule was unnec-
205. 34 Cal. 3d at 664-65, 669 P.2d at 20, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 784. See supra notes 3-87 and
accompanying text. The initiative was also challenged on the grounds that it violated the due
process and equal protection clauses of the United States and California Constitutions, that it
failed to provide for redistricting of the legislature in 1991, that it violated the "single-subject"
rule of initiatives contained in the state constitution and that it failed to meet the "one man,
one vote" standard of equal representation. Id. at 665, 669 P.2d at 20, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 784.
These challenges were not discussed by the court.
206. Id. at 664-65, 669 P.2d at 20, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 784.
207. 152 Cal. 224, 92 P. 353 (1907). See supra note 98.
208. 199 Cal. 144, 248 P. 511 (1926). See supra note 98.
209. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d at 687, 669 P.2d at 38, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 802 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
210. Id. (Richardson, J., dissenting).
211. See supra note 98.
212. 34 Cal. 3d at 676, 669 P.2d at 27-28, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 791-92. See Clean Air Constitu-
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essary to the holding in each case, it is questionable whether the "once-
per-decade" apportionment rule as formulated in Wheeler and Dowell
should even be applicable to the Sebastiani Initiative.
Moreover, the rule of Yorty v. Anderson2 13 offers a reason not to
apply the once-per-decade rule to the Sebastiani facts. The dissent in
Deukmejan cited Yorty as justifying an exception to the one apportion-
ment per decade rule.214 There the court held that the legislature was
free to enact a second reapportionment plan in anticipation of, and to be
effective only upon, the nullification of their first plan. If the Sebastiani
Initiative had been approved by the voters, it too would have repealed
the existing reapportionment plan. Since Plan II would then have been
nullified, the people were free, under the Yorty rule, to enact a plan of
their own choosing. 15
To hold that the Sebastiani Initiative could not effectively repeal the
existing Plan II would deny the people's right to enact and repeal statutes
under the initiative power. As the dissent in Deukmejian complained:
"The Legislature's role in reapportionment cannot rise to a higher level
than that of its source, the people, nor can it, a creation of the people,
constitutionally preempt the public. '216 The majority, in effect, would be
allowing the legislature to preempt the public. The legislature and the
people were therefore engaged in a race to enact the first reapportion-
ment statute. Because of procedural obstacles in the initiative qualifica-
tion process, this is a race the public will always lose.217
In refusing to recognize an exception to the one apportionment per
decade rule for initiative measures, the court cut significant inroads into
the people's initiative power. The rationale that the people's legislative
power can be no greater than the legislature's legislative power is disin-
genuous. The restrictions imposed by the constitution on initiatives and
legislative enactments differ in several significant respects. The proce-
dural requirements are undeniably different. In addition, absent express
language authorizing legislative amendment, an initiative statute cannot
ency v. Air Resources Bd., 11 Cal. 3d 801, 813-14, 114 Cal. Rptr. 577, 584-85 (1974); Serrano
v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 596, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 609, cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907
(1971); Select Base Materials v. Board of Equalization, 51 Cal. 2d 640, 645, 335 P.2d 672, 675-
76 (1959).
213. 60 Cal. 2d 312, 384 P.2d 417, 33 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1963).
214. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d at 687, 669 P.2d at 38, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 802 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
215. Id. at 687-88, 669 P.2d at 38, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 802 (Richardson, J., dissenting).





be amended by the legislature.218 Also, the people have the right to
amend the constitution by majority vote, while the legislature can only
suggest constitutional changes by a two-thirds vote.219 In many respects,
it is not unreasonable to view the initiative power as the greater of the
two. Enhancing the initiative power would be consistent with the prior
standard of judicial deference and broad construction.220
Unfortunately, recent decisions by other jurisdictions on the one ap-
portionment per decade rule proved unpersuasive for the court. The ma-
jority cited numerous older cases from other states in support of the one
apportionment per decade rule formulated in Wheeler.221 Two more
modem cases, where the "once-per-decade" rule was a matter of first
impression, found no such rule applicable to legislative statutes reappor-
tioning congressional districts. In In re Initiative Petition No. 317,222 a
legislative statute setting boundaries for Oklahoma's six congressional
districts was challenged by intiative. The Oklahoma initiative, like the
Sebastiani Initiative, would have repealed the legislative statute and en-
acted a new set of political boundaries. Opponents of the initiative chal-
lenged it on the basis of a putative one apportionment per decade rule.223
The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that neither the United States
Constitution nor federal statutory law contained any prohibition against
a second valid congressional reapportionment within the ten-year pe-
riod.224 Neither did the Oklahoma State Constitution restrict the initia-
tive's use to challenge a legislative congressional reapportionment.225
Similarly, in Exon v. Tiemann,226 the federal District Court of Ne-
braska held that there is no federal constitutional limitation on congres-
sional reapportionment more than once in a decennial period.227 Thus,
218. The California Constitution provides in pertinent part: "The Legislature may amend
or repeal referendum statutes. It may amend or repeal an initiative statute by another statute
that becomes effective only when approved by the electors unless the initiative statute permits
amendment or repeal without their approval." CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10.
219. Id.
220. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
221. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d at 669, 669 P.2d at 22, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 787. See Wheeler, 152
Cal. 224, 240, 92 P. 353, 362 (1907).
222. 648 P.2d 1207 (Okla. 1982).
223. Id. at 1212.
224. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) (1976)).
225. Id. The court said: "We hold that the electorate of Oklahoma are entitled to invoke
the initiative against a legislative congressional redistricting act even though the initiative and
the legislative enactment occur during the same ten (10) year period and are based upon the
same federal census." Id.
226. 279 F. Supp. 603 (D.C. Neb. 1967).
227. Id. at 608. The court noted, however, that the Nebraska State Constitution prohibited
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under both of these authorities, an initiative challenging and rewriting a
congressional reapportionment is clearly permissible.
Given these cases directly on point, albeit only of persuasive and not
mandatory precedential value to the California Supreme Court, the
Deukmejian majority clearly erred. The Sebastiani challenge to the con-
gressional districting plan, if not the legislative districting plan, should
have been allowed to proceed. The majority recognized that there was
no express prohibition in the federal constitution against a second reap-
portionment in one decade.228 The majority also must have recognized
that, by its own terms, the separate provisions of the Sebastiani Initiative
were severable. The part of the Sebastiani Initiative relating to congres-
sional reapportionment could have been allowed to stand, even if the
legislative reapportionment provisions were found constitutionally defec-
five. Despite persuasive authority in support of upholding at least a por-
tion of the initiative, the majority failed to liberally construe the initiative
power "to promote the democratic process."22 9
C. The Statutory Role of Initiatives in Eu
The challenge to the BFB Initiative in AFL-CIO v. Eu was based on
an alleged violation of both the state and the federal Constitutions. Peti-
tioners argued, and the majority agreed, that the federal Constitution
specified that the application to Congress had to be made by a legisla-
ture; it could not be made by the people through the initiative.230 Neither
could the people compel the legislature to make such application. The
majority also asserted that the BFB Initiative violated the initiative pro-
visions of the state constitution as well. The balanced budget proposal
was simply beyond the power of the people to enact via the initiative
reapportionment of legislative districts more than once per decade. There was no such limita-
tion in the Nebraska Constitution on congressional districting. Id.
228. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
229. Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. Board of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d
208, 219, 583 P.2d 1281, 1291, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 248 (1978). The majority claimed instead
that In re Initiative Petition No. 317, 648 P.2d 1207 (Okla. 1982) did not address the question
of the effect of a state constitutional "once-a-decade" limitation on districting by initiative, and
"thus provides no authority or guidance on this point." Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d at 676 n.16,
669 P.2d at 32 n.16, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 791 n.16. But the Oklahoma Supreme Court did address
that very point, insofar as the Oklahoma Constitution affected congressional districting. See
supra note 225 and accompanying text.
The Deukmejian majority, it appears, assumed its way to a conclusion on this point:
"Although former article IV, section 6, by its terms applied only to legislative districts, it was
assumed that the once-a-decade rule of Wheeler and Dowell applied to congressional districts
as well." Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d at 671, 669 P.2d at 24, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 788. See supra note
103 and accompanying text.




Article II of the California Constitution defines the initiative as the
"power of the electors to propose statutes and amendments to the Consti-
tution and to adopt or reject them., 2 32 The majority in Eu narrowly
construed the scope of the initiative powers in light of this language.
Since the BFB proposal was neither clearly a "statute" nor an "amend-
ment," it was not a permissible subject of the initiative.
The majority's holding can be criticized on at least three grounds.
First, the majority has changed the standards of review applicable to the
initiative power. Instead of applying a liberal construction to the initia-
tive provisions in the constitution, as prior cases had instructed,233 the
majority read the constitutional language quite narrowly. A less literal
interpretation of the word "statute," that is, one which includes all legis-
lative acts, is probably closer to the intent of Hiram Johnson and the
originators of the initiative power. Under a liberal construction of the
people's initiative power, as the dissent pointed out, the people clearly
would have the authority to direct the legislature to apply for a constitu-
tional convention.234 It is entirely reasonable to call such an attempt a
proposal to enact a "statute."
Second, the majority refused to read the BFB Initiative's directive to
the legislature as a statute. The majority found the initiative to be "in
form neither a statute nor a resolution. ' 235 It simply mandated the legis-
lature to adopt a resolution. For the majority, the distinction between an
initiative which enacts a statute and one which commands the legislature
to do so was constitutionally significant. The majority held that if the
people could not enact a measure directly through the initiative, they
should not be permitted to do so indirectly. Since the resolution to be
enacted by the legislature does not create a law but merely expresses the
will of the legislature, it was not a statute within the meaning of article II
of the California Constitution. As such, it was beyond the initiative
power.
236
However, the majority in Eu chose to ignore a crucial fact. The
BFB Initiative expressly provided for the amendment of the California
231. Id. at 706, 686 P.2d at 622, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
232. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(a) (emphasis added).
233. 36 Cal. 3d at 708, 686 P.2d at 623, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 103. See supra notes 9-13 and
accompanying text.
234. 36 Cal. 3d at 720-21, 686 P.2d at 632-33, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 112-13 (Lucas, J.,
dissenting).
235. Id. at 714, 686 P.2d at 627, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 107 (emphasis added).
236. Id.
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Government Code.237 Legislative pay and benefits would be made condi-
tional upon the enactment of an application to Congress. This amend-
ment to the Government Code cannot be seen in any way other than as a
"statute."
Third, the majority failed to apply the holding of the case it cited
which developed a test in California for determining whether an enact-
ment was a statute or a resolution. In Hopping v. City of Richmond,23
the supreme court declared that the referendum under state law applied
only to acts passed in the form of a statute.239 The city ordinance at issue
in Hopping had been passed as a resolution. The court said there that as
a resolution, the ordinance would not be subject to the power of referen-
dum. The court found that in actual effect, however, the ordinance was a
law and not a resolution because it fixed the means to accomplish the
stated purpose. Therefore, although nominally a resolution, the city or-
dinance was subject to the referendum. The rule in Hopping is thus that
it is the substance and not the form which controls. If a resolution does
in fact enact a law, it is subject to the referendum and, by implication, to
the initiative.24
In Eu, the court should have looked at the substance of the BFB
Initiative. The BFB Initiative's section two expressly compels the legisla-
ture to enact the proposal specified in section 1.241 The provisions of
section 2 clearly constitute a "statute," in substance if not in form.
D. Preemption by the Legislature
By enacting Plan II as an urgency measure, the legislature fore-
stalled another reapportionment challenge by referendum to the assem-
bly and senate redistricting plans.242 As the dissent in Legislature v.
Deukmejian pointed out, by this action the legislature managed to thwart
the people's ability to review its action, thereby assuring that the legisla-
ture would have the final word.243 By striking the Sebastiani Initiative
from the ballot, the supreme court endorsed the legislature's preemption
237. See supra note 142.
238. 170 Cal. 605, 150 P. 977 (1915).
239. Id. at 613-15, 150 P. at 980-81.
240. Id.
241. See supra note 142.
242. Only the senate and assembly district plan was adopted as an urgency measure. The
congressional and board of equalization districts plan was adopted as a regular, non-urgency
statute. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.




action and ensured that Plan II would remain in existence until after the
next decennial census.
In approving the legislature's preemption of the people, the supreme
court continued a well established precedent of almost absolute deference
to legislative declarations of urgency. Had the court wanted to review
the declaration of urgency, authority exists for judicial intervention into
legislative procedural affairs to protect substantial rights. In Stockburger
v. Jordan2 the court heard such a challenge. The court in Stockburger
held that it would not interfere with a legislative declaration of urgency
unless it was clear that the facts constituting the putative emergency
were false. Where, as in that case, the legislative declaration appeared to
have some merit, the court would not interfere.2"'
In Deukmejian, a Stockburger-like review should have been under-
taken. The declaration of urgency in chapter 8 does not ring true.246
The fact that the legislature failed to make a similar determination that
the same facts applied to chapter 6 is inconsistent with their actions re-
garding chapter 8, because both bills would impact the June, 1984 elec-
tion in exactly the same way.
On the local level, several cases have reviewed declarations of ur-
gency to make ordinances effective immediately. In particular, judicial
scrutiny has been especially rigorous when it was obvious such action
was taken solely to prevent a referendum challenge.
Given this precedent, proponents of the Sebastiani Initiative may
have erred in not challenging the urgency appellation given to chapter 8.
If such a challenge had been successful, chapter 8 would not have be-
come effective until October 18, 1983, more than a month after the
court's decision in the present case.247 The majority could well have
decided to let the Sebastiani Initiative proceed, under this scenario, be-
244. 10 Cal. 2d 636, 76 P.2d 671 (1938).
245. Id. at 642, 76 P.2d at 673-74.
246. The statute's urgency clause read as follows:
SEC. 8. This act is an urgency statute necessary for the immediate preserva-
tion of the public peace, health, or safety within the meaning of Article IV of the
Constitution and shall go into immediate effect. The facts constituting the necessity
are:
In order that the Secretary of State and the several county clerks may have
sufficient time to prepare for the 1984 elections, and in order to comply at the earliest
possible time with the California Supreme Court ruling, ordering the Legislature to
adopt an essentially different plan in time for the 1984 elections, it is necessary that
this act take effect immediately.
Cal. S.B. 3 (Boatwright), 1983-84 Extra. Sess., ch. 8 (1983).
247. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. The court handed down its decision in
this case on September 15, 1983.
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cause of the clear precedent of Yorty v. Anderson.248 Even after Legisla-
ture v. Deukmejian was decided, an effort to obtain enough signatures for
a referendum challenge was theoretically possible, even if somewhat
impractical.249
When opponents of a governmental enactment have failed to chal-
lenge it by referendum, authority exists for allowing use of an initiative to
accomplish the same objective. An initiative may repeal by implication
provisions of conflicting general statutes.250 In addition, failure to assert
a referendum petition within the time allowed by law does not foreclose
the power to seek a change in legislative policy by the initiative
process.251
Several appellate courts have stated the rule that the initiative can-
not be used as an indirect or backhanded technique to invoke the referen-
dum process where that process is unavailable.252 However, a more
recent appellate court ruling rejected that rule. In Carlson v. Cory,25 3 the
First District Court of Appeal held that the initiative can be used to cir-
cumvent constitutional prohibitions on the use of the referendum.254
If the Deukmejian court had seen the initiative as a substitute for the
248. 60 Cal. 2d 312, 384 P.2d 417, 33 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1963). See supra notes 99-102 and
accompanying text.
249. If proponents had acted on the day after the decision, they would have had 32 days to
secure 393,835 signatures. In qualifying the Sebastiani Initiative, proponents gathered 573,129
signatures within a 71-day period.
250. People v. Fowler, 32 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 737, 84 P.2d 326 (1938); People v. Schuster,
122 Cal. App. Supp. 790, 10 P.2d 204 (1932). See also Duran v. Cassidy, 28 Cal. App. 3d 574,
104 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1972); Blotter v. Farrell, 42 Cal. 2d 804, 270 P.2d 481 (1954).
251. Duran v. Cassidy, 28 Cal. App. 3d 574, 582, 104 Cal. Rptr. 793, 798 (1972).
252. Gibbs v. Napa, 59 Cal. App. 3d 148, 130 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1976); Campen v. Greiner, 15
Cal. App. 3d 836, 93 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1971); Myers v. City of Pismo Beach, 241 Cal. App. 2d
237, 50 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1966).
253. 139 Cal. App. 3d 724, 189 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1983).
254. Id. at 731, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89. Carlson involved a postelection challenge to two
initiative statutes, Propositions 5 and 6, repealing the state's gift and inheritance tax laws,
enacted in the June 8, 1982 statewide election. Petitioners claimed that since the state consti-
tution forbade challenges to tax measures by referenda, see supra notes 18-19 and accompany-
ing text, the same effect could not be accomplished by way of an initiative. Id. at 727-28, 189
Cal. Rptr. at 186. The Carlson court noted that "[i]n the context of local elections [the cases
cited] have stated the 'rule' that '[a] proposed initiative ordinance cannot be used as an indirect
or backhanded technique to invoke the referendum process' where that process is not avail-
able." Id. at 731, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 189 (quoting Daye v. Lockport, 12 Cal. App. 3d 864, 91
Cal. Rptr. 124 (1970)). However, the court asserted, "[t]his 'rule'.. . has never been approved
by our Supreme Court and, in almost all of the above-cited cases, was merely dictum." Id.
The court thus declined to adopt such a rule, thereby allowing proponents to do by initiative
what they were precluded from doing by referendum. The court concluded that the real im-
port of the cases cited was that neither the initiative nor the referendum may be used "in a




referendum, it could justifiably have allowed the measure to proceed to a
vote. Several factors support this conclusion: the state constitution de-
scribes the initiative power as the power to "adopt or reject" laws.
255
The Sebastiani Initiative contained a repeal provision in section 1.256 De-
spite the designation as an initiative, the interpretation of the measure as
a repeal statute is the only one which would have upheld the public's
right to express its views in, and participate in, the reapportionment
imbroglio.
Alternatively, the Sebastiani Initiative contained provisions for sev-
erability.25 7 Thus, the court could have severed section 1 (calling for
repeal of chapters 6 and 8) from the rest of the initiative, which con-
tained Plan III. While logically strained, this choice would have been in
keeping with the rule of liberal construction and upholding severed por-
tions of a statute that are capable of standing alone. Of course, had the
court recognized the Sebastiani Initiative as a repeal statute, there would
have been no reason to sever the new plan. Under Yorty, the power to
enact a new plan would remain once the existing plan (Plan II) was de-
termined to be inoperative.258
In endorsing the legislature's preemption of the public, the court
significantly narrowed the scope of the initiative and referendum in Cali-
fornia. By declining to take the several options open to them, the court
implied that the public had no right to enact a reapportionment plan and
the initiative power should be curtailed for use in this subject area.
259
E. Reapportionment by Initiative
In addressing reapportionment, the court in Legislature v.
Deukmejian faced the thorniest of political issues. Reapportionment im-
plicates the most basic of constitutional values in our representative sys-
tem-the right to a meaningful and equal vote. As a political problem, it
is as intractable as it is controversial. For over two decades in California
the reapportionment controversy has consumed the passions and labors
of the legislature and embroiled the courts in a partisan miasma.260 Yet
at the same time, as critical as the reapportionment question is to the
255. CAL. CONsT. art. II, § 8(a) (emphasis added).
256. SEC'Y OF STATE OF CAL. SEBASTIANI INITIATIVE.
257. Id.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
259. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d at 681, 685, 669 P.2d at 33, 36, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 791, 800
(Richardson, J., dissenting) (citing the majority opinion at 34 Cal. 3d at 673, 679, 669 P.2d at
26, 30, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 790, 794).
260. This is not to say that reapportionment has not been a controversial issue ever since
California's first constitution was enacted. Although numerous reapportionment issues were
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determination of all other political issues, it is beyond the ken of most
citizens. It is neither easily explained nor readily understood.
The Sebastiani Initiative was the first attempt in California to enact
a statewide reapportionment plan through the initiative process.
261
Although numerous other initiative measures have addressed the topic of
reapportionment, each was concerned with the method, procedure or cri-
teria with which reapportionment should be conducted. 6u None of them
attempted the adoption of actual district boundaries.
A fundamental question at the heart of the Deukmejian decision is
whether the people, acting through the initiative process, could enact a
reapportionment plan. That is, even absent a prior enactment by the leg-
islature, is the power of direct legislation a constitutionally permissible
tool to redraw the state's 165 political districts?
Quite clearly, the dissent in Deukmejian answered that question in
the affirmative. The majority opinion implied that there is at least some
doubt. Twice, in fact, the majority suggested it would have answered
negatively.263 The majority opinion did not, however, reach this ques-
tion in arriving at its conclusion. But one cannot help but surmise that
the majority holding was colored by the belief that the enactment of a
reapportionment plan could not practically and constitutionally be
achieved by direct legislation.
litigated prior to that time, the courts became most actively involved in supervising the reap-
portionment process in 1961.
261. Id. at 663, 669 P.2d at 18, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 787 ("an attempt-novel in the history of
this state").
262. The subject of reapportionment has been a very popular topic among the initiative
measures proposed. Each measure has proposed a change in the reapportionment process,
rather than proposed a reapportionment plan like the Sebastiani Initiative. Prior reapportion-
ment measures and their official titles are, in chronological order: 1922, Legislative Districts-
Changes Method of Selecting Members of the Legislature (failed to qualify); 1924, Legislative
Districts-Reapportionment (failed to qualify); 1926, Reapportionment Commission (Prop.
20) (rejected by voters), Legislative Reapportionment (Prop. 28) (approved by voters); 1946,
Reapportionment of Senatorial Districts (failed to qualify); 1948, Senate Reapportionment
(Prop. 14) (rejected by voters); 1960, Senate Reapportionment (Prop. 5) (rejected by voters);
1962, Senate Reapportionment (Prop. 23) (rejected by voters); 1982, Reapportionment-Legis-
lative Districts (failed to qualify), Reapportionment by Districting Commission or Supreme
Court (Prop. 14) (rejected by voters); 1983, Reapportionment of Assembly, Senate and Con-
gressional Districts (Sebastiani Initiative) (qualified but removed from the ballot by the
supreme court); 1984, Reapportionment (Prop. 39) (rejected by voters). HISTORY OF THE
CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE, supra note 2, at 14.
263. See id. at 673, 669 P.2d at 26, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 790 ("Assuming, but not deciding, that
redistricting by initiative is permissible .. "); id. at 679, 669 P.2d at 30, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 794
("First, assuming that the initiative is generally available in the redistricting process notwith-
standing the command of article XXI that '[tihe Legislature shall adjust the boundary lines
. ....') (emphasis added by majority opinion).
1092
CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE
Yet, the supreme court on several occasions has stated that an act
reapportioning the state legislature is a proper subject of the initiative
and referendum powers.2" In Assembly v. Deukmejian,zf5 the court re-
jected a claim that reapportionment statutes are exempt from the referen-
dum power because they might be deemed "statutes calling elections. 266
While it is obvious that reapportionment statutes relate to elections, the
court found it equally clear that "such statutes do not call elections."267
If reapportionment is a proper subject for a referendum, it can equally be
subject to the initiative power. As we have seen earlier, the initiative
power is equal to if not greater than the referendum power in that the
initiative encompasses a wider breadth of subjects.2 68 Thus, while an
actual district redrawing has never before been proposed by initiative, it
is hard to see how it could not be included within the initiative's scope.
There is precedent for this conclusion on the local level. In Ortiz v.
Madera County Board of Supervisors,269 the Fifth District Court of Ap-
peal upheld the right to realign county supervisorial districts by initia-
tive. An ordinance redistricting county supervisorial districts in Ortiz
was challenged by an initiative. The county claimed that such an at-
tempt was invalid as the districting ordinance had been made immedi-
ately effective. In upholding the right to challenge the measure by
initiative, the court in Ortiz stated that a "[cihange in supervisorial dis-
trict boundaries is a legislative function and thus subject to the referen-
dum."27 Furthermore, the court reasoned that "because the nature of
the initiative and referendum are identical insofar as the power reserved
is concerned, any discussion in the decisional law regarding the initiative
also applies to the referendum.
271
In Harnett v. County of Sacramento,27 2 the court assumed that the
people had the right to enact a valid ordinance redrawing supervisorial
district lines. In that case though, an attempt to do so was enjoined for
failing to conform to equal representation standards established by state
264. Assembly v. Deukmejian, 30 Cal. 3d 638, 654, 639 P.2d 939, 949, 180 Cal. Rptr. 297,
307, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 456 U.S. 941 (1982); Boggs v. Jordan, 204 Cal. 207,
220, 267 P. 696, 701 (1928).
265. 30 Cal. 3d 638, 639 P.2d 939, 180 Cal. Rptr. 297, cert. denied and appeal dismissed,
456 U.S. 941 (1982).
266. Id. at 654, 639 P.2d at 949, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 307. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 9(a) exempts
statutes calling elections from the referendum.
267. 30 Cal. 3d at 654, 639 P.2d at 949, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 307 (emphasis added).
268. See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
269. 107 Cal. App. 3d 866, 166 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1980).
270. Id. at 872, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 104 (emphasis added).
271. Id. at 870 n.3, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 103 n.3.
272. 195 Cal. 676, 235 P. 445 (1925).
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law. The reapportionment plan there was held void because the resulting
districts were grossly disproportional and "the reservation of the initia-
tive power to the electors of the counties does not authorize any legisla-
tion . . . in contravention of any statute passed by the state
legislature. 273
The Harnett court's decision assumed that the authority to reappor-
tion was present; the defect lay in the substantive provisions of the reap-
portionment plan. According to this rule, the same plan, if proposed by
the supervisors themselves, would have the same defect and would like-
wise be found invalid. By contrast, the Deukmejian majority seemed to
deny the people's authority to enact a reapportionment plan, regardless
of its substantive provisions, once the legislature had acted. While the
Sebastiani Initiative might well have been found deficient on other consti-
tutional grounds,274 it was not accorded the same presumption of validity
usually given to legislative enactments.
There are, of course, numerous policy reasons for denying the right
to reapportion through the initiative process. The nature of reapportion-
ment offers special problems. Reapportionment statutes are not easy to
read. They often are comprised of little more than row upon row of
census tract numbers designating the individual assembly districts. Sen-
ate and congressional district plans typically consist of combinations of
assembly districts and census tracts. Rarely do the statutes include a
map depicting the outlines of the districts; and accurate maps are usually
unavailable to the public for months after the statute passes. Yet one can
be sure that the legislators themselves are quite aware of the combina-
tions of voting blocs that make up the individual districts.
The reapportionment process is also not readily adaptable to public
initiative campaigns. Because of the highly political nature of the pro-
cess, and the fact that equi-populous districts are so susceptible to parti-
san-motivated manipulations, reapportionment plans are usually the
product of months of "horse-trading" and negotiating. In contrast, vot-
ers would be given only the simple choice of "Yay" or "Nay" on a partic-
ular plan. No rational public discourse can take place concerning the
virtues of one set of census tracts over another. In short, the subject
matter of reapportionment is not one that readily lends itself to the peti-
tion-signing and circulating procedures of the initiative process. The en-
tire process of reapportionment is not one that lends itself to multi-media
publicity campaigns or, alternatively, any kind of coherent public debate.
273. Id. at 681, 235 P. at 447.
274. See supra note 205.
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Indeed, it is only fair to wonder whether any kind of legislation lends
itself to modem-day statewide initiative campaigns!
Regardless of how one answers that question, the fact remains that,
for better or for worse, the initiative power exists in the California Con-
stitution. It can and will be a potent force for change-sometimes dra-
matic change. Equally true is the fact that the legislature constantly
deals with issues just as intractable and just as incapable of reduction into
single-issue media campaigns as the issue of reapportionment.
The Deukmejian decision can be seen as an attempt to limit the
scope of the initiative in an area with which the public is, arguably, ill-
equipped to deal. Yet, in an area as critically important to the outcome
of legislation-and indeed, the legitimacy of our democracy-as reappor-
tionment, it seems anomalous to limit the public's access to that process.
As Justice Richardson wrote in his dissent:
The people can make mistakes, so can legislatures, and so can
courts, but mistakes can be corrected. History has demon-
strated repeatedly that in the long run, the people's judgment is
ultimately to be trusted. If not, then whose?
275
V. CONCLUSION
Legislature v. Deukmejian276 and AFL-CIO v. Eu27 7 were both
highly political decisions. Deukmejian was the first time the supreme
court had addressed an attempt to reapportion statewide legislative and
congressional districts by statutory initiative. The court dealt with the
controversy by choosing the option most likely to avoid disruption of the
electoral process and provide a brief respite from continual reapportion-
ment squabbles. However, the court's holding was based on a narrow,
technical argument of constitutional interpretation. Against the back-
drop of political events leading up to this case, including the legislature's
actions to preempt the public, that holding was inappropriate.
Similarly, in Eu, the supreme court reached for a narrow, technical
basis in voiding a dramatic attempt to impose the people's will on a recal-
citrant legislature. The history of the initiative in the constitution and
the court's traditional deference to the initiative power suggest a contrary
result.
The supreme court's decisions in Deukmejian and Eu narrow the
275. 34 Cal. 3d at 691, 669 P.2d at 40, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 804 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
276. 34 Cal. 3d 658, 669 P.2d 17, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983). See supra notes 65-139 and
accompanying text.
277. 36 Cal. 3d 687, 686 P.2d 609, 206 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1984). See supra notes 140-85 and
accompanying text.
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scope of the initiative power, contrary to its past pronouncements. In-
stead of "jealously guard[ing]"2 7 8 "one of the most precious rights of our
democratic process,"'2 79 the court constricted its use. Substantive limita-
tions have been placed upon the initiative power where merely proce-
dural restraints stood before. Since the initiative is the ultimate check
against abusive legislative power, the Deukmejian and Eu holdings
should be limited to their unique facts and narrow grounds. Future
courts, as those in the past have done, should "apply a liberal construc-
tion to this power wherever it is challenged in order that the right be not
improperly annulled."28
Greg M. Salvato
278. Martin v. Smith, 176 Cal. App. 2d 115, 117, 1 Cal. Rptr. 307, 309 (1959).
279. Mervynne v. Acker, 189 Cal. App. 2d 558, 563-64, 11 Cal. Rptr. 340, 344 (1961).
280. Id. at 563, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
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